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Communicative Imperatives in
Central Banks
Douglas R. Holmes†
For the first time [August 12, 2003], the [Federal Open Market] Committee
(FOMC)] was using communication— mere words— as its primary monetary
policy tool.  Until then, it was probably common to think of communication
about future policy as something that supplemented the setting of the fed-
eral funds rate.  In this case, communication was an independent and effec-
tive tool for influencing the economy.  The FOMC had journeyed from
“never explain” to a point where sometimes the explanation is the policy.1
Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
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Public Currency
Central bankers have for three or four decades been engaged in a deep,
albeit implicit, anthropological exploration, a search for new means by
which monetary affairs could be anchored conceptually— not to gold or to
regimes of fixed exchange rates— by means of an evolving relationship with
the public, a relationship in which our predicaments could serve as the
† Douglas R. Holmes is Professor of Anthropology at the State University of New
York, Binghamton.  He is the author of ECONOMY OF WORDS: COMMUNICATIVE IMPERATIVES
IN CENTRAL BANKS (2014), Integral Europe: Fast-Capitalism, Multiculturalism, Neofascism
(2000), and Cultural Disenchantments: Worker Peasantries in Northeast Italy (1989).
1. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at
the Society of American Business Editors and Writers 50th Anniversary Conference:
Communication in Monetary Policy 8– 9 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130404a.pdf.
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fulcrum of policy.2
The public has been recruited to participate in the staging of this
drama by means of persuasive analytical stories intended to shape expecta-
tions and, thus, economic behavior prospectively.3  This evolving commu-
nicative relationship is sustained and enlivened by research, research
that— among other things— continually gleans the descriptive, explanatory,
and interpretive labor of economic actors, incorporating their intelligence
for the purposes of formulating policy.  The challenge for central bankers,
many of whom had a hand in designing this regime, is to navigate and
manage the shifting grounds upon which members of the public are
becoming protagonists in monetary affairs and upon which their circum-
stances are becoming the imperatives of and for policy.
My research has not been about the financial crisis per se, rather it is
about the creation of a monetary regime— a regime impelled by a series of
communicative experiments that predates the crisis and that has continued
to be refined and modified in the teeth of the unfolding turmoil.4  This
compendium of experiments— in which we are all participants, knowingly
or not— has, however, been instrumental in the management of some of the
most vexing circumstances that arose in the wake of the failure of financial
markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.5
Known narrowly and rather prosaically as “inflation targeting,” these
experiments established the intellectual architecture and the regulatory
mechanisms of a monetary system that I have defined6 in relationship to
the concept of a “public currency,” a term used in passing by Mervyn King,
Governor of the Bank of England between 2003 and 2013.7  At the heart of
this regime is a far-reaching premise: the public broadly must be recruited
to collaborate with central banks in achieving the ends of monetary policy,
namely “stable prices and confidence in the currency.”8
2. See SERGE JEANNEAU, COMMUNICATION OF MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS BY CENTRAL
BANKS: WHAT IS REVEALED AND WHY 6– 7 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
bppdf/bispap47.pdf.
3. See Yellen, supra note 1, at 6.
4. See ALAN S. BLINDER, THE QUIET REVOLUTION: CENTRAL BANKING GOES MODERN
(2004); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Symposium: Monetary Policy
since the Onset of the Crisis, 9 (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120831a.pdf.
5. See generally JANET ROITMAN, ANTI-CRISIS (2013); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: THE
INSIDE STORY OF J.P. MORGAN AND HOW WALL STREET GREED CORRUPTED ITS BOLD DREAM
AND CREATED A FINANCIAL CATASTROPHE (2010); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, OUT OF CRISIS:
RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL MARKETS 54– 55 (2010); Claudio Borio, Keynote Address at
the European Money and Finance Forum– National Bank of Poland Conference “Mone-
tary Policy after the Crisis”: Central Banking Post-Crisis: What Compass for Unchar-
tered Waters? (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www.suerf.org/download/warsaw11/
presentations/0borio.pdf.
6. DOUGLAS R. HOLMES, ECONOMY OF WORDS: COMMUNICATIVE IMPERATIVES IN CEN-
TRAL BANKS (2014).
7. See, e.g., Mervyn King, Richard T. Ely Lecture: The Institutions of Monetary Policy,
94 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 1, 2 (2004).
8. Core Purposes, BANK OF ENGLAND, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/
Pages/corepurposes/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
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In 2001, I began examining the intellectual routines that inform con-
temporary practices of central banking.  After a preliminary visit to the
New York District Branch of the Federal Reserve, the project shifted to
Frankfurt, headquarters of the European Central Bank and the Deutsche
Bundesbank.  Over the last decade, the project expanded and I have pur-
sued research at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank,
and the Bank of England.  In the background of the study is an ongoing
assessment of the policies and practices of the United States Federal
Reserve.
Beyond my attention to central bankers’ research— the research upon
which monetary policy is formulated— I have been concerned with a par-
ticular aspect of work within these institutions, namely, the drafting of
technical reports, writing of speeches, crafting of presentations, compiling
of briefing documents, and composing of policy statements.9  Far from
being routine records of institutional matters, these documents are pre-
pared for the purpose of shaping economic and monetary conditions pro-
spectively, as instruments of persuasion.10
In this regard, I followed initially the method developed by Bruno
Latour in his classic study, The Pasteurization of France (1988).11  Latour
demonstrated how a revolution in the science of bacteriology unfolded as a
communicative phenomenon serialized by means of prestigious scientific
journals Revue Scientifique, Annales de l’Institut Pasteur and Concours Me´di-
cal.12  These journals not only reported contemporaneously on the devel-
opment of scientific discoveries, but they also endowed the revolution with
intellectual form and content that ultimately, as Latour demonstrates,
transformed not merely hygiene and public health but the fundamental
fabric of French society.13  The communicative dynamics operating within
the field of monetary policy are far more consequential insofar as, Annelise
Riles asserts, markets themselves are a function of language (personal
communication).14
I tracked the reports serialized in the Monetary Policy Statement of the
9. See Julia Elyachar, Regulating Crisis: A Retrospective Ethnography of the 1982 Latin
American Debt Crisis at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, 1 VALUATION STUD. 147
(2013).
10. See Annelise Riles, Real Time: Governing the Market after the Failure of Knowledge,
Northwest Law, Law & Economics Research Paper 01-2 (2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272598; Annelise Riles, Introduction: In
Response, in ARTIFACTS OF MODERN KNOWLEDGE 1– 38 (Annelise Riles ed., 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Riles, Introduction]; KAUSHIK SUNDER RAJAN, BIOCAPITAL: THE CONSTITUTION OF POSTGE-
NOMIC LIFE (2006).
11. See BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE (Alan Sheridan & John Law,
trans., 1993).
12. See id. at 3– 12.
13. Id.
14. ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT 25– 27 (2000) [hereinafter RILES, THE
NETWORK INSIDE OUT]; Riles, Introduction, supra note 10; Annelise Riles, Real Time:
Unwinding Technocratic and Anthropological Knowledge, 31 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 392,
396– 98 (2004); ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASONING IN THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 11 (2011).
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Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ),15 the Monthly Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB),16 the Monthly Report of the Deutsche
Bundesbank,17 the minutes of meetings and reports of the Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England (MPC),18 and the minutes of the Execu-
tive Board of the Sveriges Riksbank’s Monetary Policy Meeting.19  Using
these and other documents, I show how the regular communication of cen-
tral bank policy assessments plays a decisive role in the emergence and
refinement of a monetary regime over and above the articulation of specific
policy positions.  Rather than the reception or efficacy of policy state-
ments, which central banks believe they can measure quantitatively, it is
the crafting and modeling of collaborative relationships with the public
that is the most radical feature of this regime.  My thesis here is that these
policy statements are not merely expressing an interpretative account or
commentary; they are making the economy itself as a communicative field
and as an empirical fact.20
In what follows, I discuss the imperatives driving the creation of a
public currency.  I examine how communication operates as regulation,
how “mere words,” as Janet Yellen averred, can serve as a central bank’s
15. See Monetary Policy, RES. BANK OF N.Z., http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/mone-
tary_policy/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
16. See Monthly Bulletin, EUR. CENT. BANK, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/mb/
html/index.en.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
17. Current Monthly Reports, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, http://www.bundesbank.de/
Navigation/EN/Publications/Monthly_reports/monthly_reports.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2014).
18. See, e.g., BANK OF ENG. MONETARY POLICY COMM., AGENTS’ SUMMARY OF BUSINESS
CONDITIONS (July 2010), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Documents/agentssummary/agsum10jul.pdf; BANK OF ENG. MONETARY POLICY COMM.,
BANK OF ENGLAND/NOP INFLATION ATTITUDES SURVEYS (JUNE 12, 2013), available at http:/
/www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/other/nop.aspx; BANK OF ENG. MONE-
TARY POLICY COMM., INFLATION REPORT (May 2011), available at http://www.bankofen-
gland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/ir11may.pdf; BANK OF ENG.
MONETARY POLICY COMM., INFLATION REPORT (May 2010), available at http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/inflationreport/ir10may.pdf; BANK OF
ENG. MONETARY POLICY COMM., MINUTES OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING
(JULY 7 AND 8, 2010), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/min-
utes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2010/mpc1007.pdf; BANK OF ENG. MONETARY POLICY COMM.,
MINUTES OF THE MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING (July 6 and 7, 2011) [hereinafter
Bank of England 2011 Minutes], available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publica-
tions/minutes/Documents/mpc/pdf/2011/mpc1107.pdf; BANK OF ENG. MONETARY POL-
ICY COMM., The Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy (May 1999), available at
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/monetary/montrans.
pdf.
19. SVERIGES RIKSBANK, SEPARATE APPENDIX TO THE RIKSBANK’S COMMUNICATION POLICY
(April 2, 2009), available at http://www-riksbank-se.cdn.episerverhosting.com/Page
folders/40148/nr34e_appendix_communication_policy09.pdf; SVERIGES RIKSBANK, MIN-
UTES OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD’S MONETARY POLICY MEETING (April 20, 2009) [hereinafter
SVERIGES RIKSBANK April 20, 2009], available at http://www.riksbank.se/en/Press-and-
published/Minutes-of-the-Executive-Boards-monetary-policy-meetings/2009/Minutes-of-
the-Executive-Boards-monetary-policy-meeting-on-20-April-2009/.
20. See Douglas R. Holmes, Economy of Words, 24 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 381,
384– 403 (2009).
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“primary monetary policy tool.”21
I focus on a series of paradigmatic episodes examining the critical
labor words performed in interpellating the public as protagonists in the
creation and regulation of monetary affairs.22  In the first instance, this
monetary regime emerges from a series of deep and perhaps unlikely
predicaments rooted in data and apprehensions about the nature of infor-
mation.  These “epistemic anxieties,” as Ann Stoler calls them, yielded
equally unlikely modalities of research establishing a range of collabora-
tions with various segments and strata of the public.23  Analytical mod-
els— the “machineries of knowing,” as Karin Knorr-Cetina terms them24—
that orchestrate research practices in central banks must be viewed also as
machineries of relation, capable of articulating policy to address both the
distinctive and the shared circumstances of individuals and firms who are
continually modeling and transacting economic relationships.  How does
this work?
Epistemic Networks
“[I]t is really interesting when you kind of, if you like, almost take the
anthropological approach, to the global crisis”
Timothy Besley, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of
England (2006– 2009)25
George Marcus and I, drawing on an insight from Raymond Williams,
have noted that if the industrial age was— as Williams and many others
have suggested— predicated on the rise of statistical and quantitative intel-
lectual modalities,26 then the information age is predicated on the ascen-
dancy of ethnographic and interpretative modalities.  These latter
modalities have, we have argued, been broadly assimilated, though
unmarked, across virtually every domain of technocratic practice.27
Central banks— most notably the Bank of England— cultivate networks
of interlocutors that generate what amounts to ethnographic knowledge
about the social and cultural character of the economy animated by pre-
21. Yellen, supra note 1.
22. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 127– 76 (Ben
Brewster trans. 1971).
23. ANN L. STOLER, ALONG THE ARCHIVAL GRAIN: EPISTEMIC ANXIETIES AND COLONIAL
COMMON SENSE (2008).
24. See, e.g., KARIN KNORR-CETINA, EPISTEMIC CULTURES: HOW THE SCIENCES MAKE
KNOWLEDGE 2– 10 (1999); Karin Knorr-Cetina, Culture in Global Knowledge Societies:
Knowledge Cultures and Epistemic Cultures, 32 INTERDISC. SCI. REV. 361, 361– 64 (2007).
25. BOE’s Besley Says Control of Public Finances Is “What Counts” (Bloomberg Radio
May 26, 2009), available at http://dailysplice.com/directory/Bloomberg-Economics-pod-
cast/episode-396061#.
26. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, POLITICS AND LETTERS: INTERVIEWS WITH NEW LEFT REVIEW
(1981).
27. Douglas R. Holmes & George E. Marcus, Cultures of Expertise and the Manage-
ment of Globalization: Toward the Re-Functioning of Ethnography, in GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES:
TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS, 235, 235– 252 (Aihwa
Ong & Stephen J. Collier eds., 2005).
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cisely the contextual and situational information that is typically stripped
out from conventional macroeconomic and financial analysis.  Conversa-
tions with and among these contacts constitute the communicative
interchanges by which central bankers simulate the economy “in the wild”
or “in vivo,” as Michel Callon and his colleagues have termed it, in order to
enter the arena of contemporaneous decision-making by businesspeople
and by the public.28  The Bank of England has a small staff of regional
agents that is continually assessing business conditions in the field.29  The
bank has twelve Agencies that operate across the UK and report inferen-
tially on the current state of economic conditions.30  Each of these modest
regional offices consists of an agent, one or two deputy agents, and a small
number of support personnel.31  Along with a coordinator based in
London, the agents manage what is regarded as the most sophisticated net-
work for gleaning contemporaneous intelligence on the state of the econ-
omy of any central bank in the world.32
The agents cultivate an epistemic network of interlocutors linked infor-
mally to secondary and tertiary networks of countless other contacts,
forming the circuitry of a vast communicative field across which “eco-
nomic intelligence” is continually created.33  Diverse groups of contacts
perform descriptive, explanatory, and interpretive labor, refining the con-
ceptual nature of economic phenomena in real time.  The efficacy of mone-
tary policy rests in large measure, on the representational enterprise of
these contacts with which central banks must ultimately orchestrate the
contingencies of economic stability and growth.  Periodically, the members
of the MPC, including the Governor, accompany agents on these forays into
the field.34
For example, Timothy Besley, while he was one of the nine members of
the MPC, described in May 2009 the character of the field research that
regional agents routinely conduct:
Well you know I spend a lot of my time, and it has been one of the joys
when I have been on the [MPC], talking to businesses.  In fact, only last week
I was out on the road 40, 50 miles away from London talking to a number of
businesses and it is really interesting when you kind of, if you like, almost
take the anthropological approach, to the global crisis.  You sit down, per-
haps with an entrepreneur, somebody who is in a small business, could be a
midsize business, and they give you their own window on the global crisis,
and what is interesting about that is each of them will have their own partic-
ular story about how it is hitting them.  And while in the end we talk of these
big macro trends, it’s really pretty fascinating to see how it plays out in a
28. See, e.g., Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestica-
tion of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION, AND BELIEF: A
NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE?, 196, 196– 223 (John Law ed., 1986).
29. Phil Eckersley & Pamela Webber, The Bank’s Regional Agencies, 43 BANK ENG. Q.
Bull. 92, 93 (2003).
30. Id. at 93– 94.
31. Id. at 93.
32. See id. at 96.
33. See id. at 92– 93.
34. Id. at 95.
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particular context.  One thing you quickly learn though, there is no single
model of how the global crisis is evolving at that micro level even though the
big picture trends are very familiar.35
Having explicitly acknowledged the complementary relation between
the intellectual practices of anthropologists and central bankers, Professor
Besley made his own ethnographic observation, noting that during his
sojourns in the field he observed the ebbs and the flows of what he termed
the “currency of confidence,” a phenomenon that was neither fully nor nec-
essarily evident from his conventional purview as an economist.36  “We
hear time and time again,” Besley continued, that “the currency of confi-
dence is hugely important to people who run businesses.37  Something I
perhaps learned as an economist, we do talk about animal spirits and we
talk about the psychology of confidence, but [it is] something I guess I
hadn’t quite appreciated as much as I do now as I go on the road.”38  Going
into the field opened interpretative insights for Besley, insights on how the
decisions that he was making as a member of the MPC shaped expecta-
tions and animated or subverted confidence.39  His purview permitted
access to the motives and reflections of protagonists operating in various
domains of business allowing him to engage the creative dynamics of the
economy in vivo— dynamics not merely or necessarily reducible to Adam
Smith’s invisible hand and Alfred Marshall’s supply and demand curves.40
Besley, and his colleagues on the MPC, draw on the intellectual acu-
men of networks of actors across the UK to creatively engage the founda-
tional dynamics of the economy rooted in learning and in experience.41
Crucially, Besley was not invoking an anthropological purview to illustrate
an idiosyncratic practice of the Bank of England, but rather to gain
purchase on its core concern, the dynamics of confidence (i.e., the cumula-
tive manifestation of those sentiments impelling and shaping expecta-
tions).  The Bank actively aligns its policy with the expertise of thousands
of contacts and with their insight into the various predicaments that they
face.42  By so doing, the Bank demonstrates how the efficacy of monetary
policy rests on the enterprise of these contacts— distinct from the abstract
“rational actors” of classical economic theory— but, again, protagonists
with whom the bank must orchestrate the contingencies of economic sta-
bility and growth.
35. Bloomberg Radio, supra note 25.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id.; see also David G. Blanchflower, Member of the Bank of Eng. Monetary
Policy Comm., Bernard Corry Memorial Lecture at Queen Mary, University of London:
Recent Developments in the UK Economy: The Economics of Walking About, (May 30,
2007) available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~blnchflr/papers/speeches/speech310.
pdf; N. Gregory Mankiw, The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer 8 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12349, (2006), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w12349.
41. RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT, supra note 14.
42. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 166– 79; see also Blanchflower, supra note 40, at 7– 8.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 8 29-MAY-14 10:17
22 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
As we seek to render data increasingly precise, reliable, abstract, and
“scientific,” we strip away information— social, historical, and cultural—
that is crucial for understanding key issues defining the contemporary
world.  This is hardly a novel insight.  It is a central preoccupation of E´mile
Durkheim in his classic treatise, On Suicide,43 a study in which he explores
the process of denaturing phenomena by virtue of empirical scrutiny in a
manner that both informs and obstructs analytical understanding.44  This
is a particularly relevant challenge for central bankers, who are acutely
aware of the limitations of the analytical tools that they employ and who
understand implicitly the historically situated, socially constructed, and
culturally encumbered nature of data.  They have assimilated ethnographic
modalities— permitting alternative constructions and interpretations of
information— to perform what I initially thought were compensatory ana-
lytical maneuvers, but that I now am inclined to see as distinctive, though
typically unmarked, intellectual practices that address the circumstances of
contemporary knowledge production in technocratic settings.45  Here are
two examples.
There are two major historical insights or discoveries that the Bank of
England’s epistemic network is credited with capturing.  In the mid-1990s
during a period of unanticipated price moderation, the agents of the bank
were able to provide a compelling explanation.46  Their contacts were tell-
ing them that their costs were moderating because of China.47  This was at
a time when there was little statistical evidence and a general skepticism
among economists that Chinese suppliers could influence global prices
because of the then relatively small size of the Chinese economy.48  The
consistent articulation of this fact on the part of a range of contacts was
increasingly persuasive to the agents and they in turn were able to convince
members of the MPC of this reality long before it became a widely under-
stood phenomenon, and certainly before it became apparent in statistical
aggregates.49
Similarly, early in the last decade, contacts explained the unexpected
moderation in wages across the UK in terms of new patterns of immigra-
tion from Eastern and Central Europe.50  Immigration from the new acces-
sion countries of the EU expanded available labor, most notably in the
booming construction industry, thus stemming constraints on the labor
market that would otherwise have led to upward pressures on wages and
43. EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (1951).
44. See Michael M. J. Fischer, Culture and Cultural Analysis as Experimental Systems,
22 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 17 (2007).
45. See also Joseph Masco, “Survival Is Your Business”: Engineering Ruins and Affect in
Nuclear America, 23 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 361, 381– 82 (2008).
46. See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 162– 63.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 162.
49. See id.
50. See Sara Lemos & Jonathan Portes, New Labour? The Impact of Migration from
Central and Eastern European Countries on the UK Labour Market 2 (Inst. for the Study of
Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3756, 2008).
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prices.51  The shifting dynamics of the UK labor market were not fully evi-
dent from the standpoint of conventional statistical measures and yet the
accounts of contacts in the field strongly expressed it.52  In both instances,
it was the contacts themselves who took the initiative of persuading the
agents and the bank of decisive shifts in economic conditions that were, at
best, dimly evident statistically or entirely invisible.53
These two historical calls raised the visibility and the credibility of the
Bank of England’s network.54  However, as the financial crisis unfolded in
late 2008, the agents’ role and the value of the epistemic network were
further enhanced.55  This intensified the requirement for up-to-date infor-
mation to inform policy decisions, the need for refined appraisals of expec-
tations and outlooks, and the demand for information on credit
conditions, balance sheets of businesses, wages, prices, and employment.
The network could be employed to pursue specific questions in “real time,”
used to systematically question businesspeople in the midst of the crisis,
and generate an abundance of information creating intricate representa-
tions of an economy in severe disequilibrium.56
There is, however, another, deeper source of epistemic anxiety that
continually encroaches on the regulatory regimes of central banks: the
future.
The Future
Many years ago, I examined the economic dilemmas and cultural
predicaments that had for centuries circumscribed the lives of a rural pop-
ulation in northeast Italy.  During that work, I encountered a question that
perplexed my subjects and continues to perplex me.  These rural folk,
descendants of peasants who had lived for roughly a thousand years under
a profoundly cruel and unjust agrarian system— enforced by a brutal
regime of numerical accounting— had undergone a change in outlook.57
They became, in the latter part of the twentieth century, susceptible to a
very un-peasant-like sentiment.  To their surprise, and to mine, they were
experiencing something that might be construed as “hope,” if not, “opti-
mism.”58  This hope was predicated upon the totality of promises con-
ferred on Italian citizens in the wake of the Second World War; the
51. David G. Blanchflower et al., The Impact of the Recent Migration from Eastern
Europe on the UK Economy  32 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 2615,
2007).
52. See id. at 23.
53. See HOLMES , supra note 6, at 162– 63.
54. See id. at 163.
55. See id. at 166, 174.
56. See id. at 163– 66.
57. See generally DOUGLAS R. HOLMES, CULTURAL DISENCHANTMENTS: WORKER PEASANT-
RIES IN NORTHEAST ITALY (1989).
58. See generally id.; HIROKAZU MIYAZAKI, THE METHOD OF HOPE: ANTHROPOLOGY, PHI-
LOSOPHY, AND FIJIAN KNOWLEDGE (2004); ANDREA MUEHLEBACH, THE MORAL NEOLIBERAL:
WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP IN ITALY (2012); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, SELECTED WORKS OF JOSEPH
E. STIGLITZ: VOLUME I: INFORMATION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2009).
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promises of welfare and dignity that underwrote the European social
model reset expectations.59  The future no longer loomed merely as a mat-
ter of dread and despair; it had become for these people a subject with
discernable features that could be reflected and acted upon.
In the broadest terms, I have examined how central banks seek to
endow the future with discernible features and how these institutions
underwrite representations of the future with faith and credit.  To do this, I
have aligned my research with a series of experiments that I alluded to
earlier initially designed by the Deutsche Bundesbank, refined, and formal-
ized as policy by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.  These experiments
seek to influence future sensibilities— not merely sensibilities about the
future but also sensibilities in the future— to shape the expectations that
impel the most fundamental dynamic of market economies: the evolution
of prices.60  The bridge to the ephemera of expectations, to sensibilities in
the future, is constructed in part with language, through the technical mod-
eling of what I refer to as an economy of words.61
The logic guiding these linguistic experiments goes like this: If the
behavior of prices is “expectational”— as Irving Fisher,62 J.M. Keynes,63
and Knut Wicksell64 initially proposed— then an anticipatory policy that
projects central bank action into the future becomes a means to influence
these sentiments.65  When you and I, as “economic agents,” assimilate pol-
icy intentions into our own personal expectations, we do the work of the
central bank.66
The instruments developed to manage expectation are expressed most
concisely in official statements— typically running between five hundred
and a few thousand words— that the major central banks of the world pub-
lish every month or two in support of their interest rate decisions that can
stimulate, retard, or leave unchanged the pacing of economic activity.67
59. See HOLMES, supra note 57, at 215– 18.
60. See generally Michael Woodford, Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of
Monetary Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8673, 2001), availa-
ble at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8673.
61. Holmes, supra note 20, at 141– 42, 237– 39.
62. See IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST: AS DETERMINED BY IMPATIENCE TO
SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT 399– 451 (1930).
63. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (1936).
64. See KNUT WICKSELL, INTEREST AND PRICES: A STUDY OF THE CAUSES REGULATING THE
VALUE OF MONEY 165– 77 (R.F. Kahn, trans. 1936).
65. See Woodford, supra note 60.
66. Vitor Gaspar et al., Adaptive Learning, Persistence, and Optimal Monetary Policy
5– 7 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 644, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=907313; see also Athanasios Orphanides & John C.
Williams, Inflation Targeting Under Imperfect Knowledge 1– 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F.,
Working Paper No. 2006-14, 2006), available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/files/wp06-14bk.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Bank of England maintains Bank Rate at 0.5% and the size of the Asset
Purchase Programme at £375 billion, BANK OF ENG. (Nov. 3, 2013 4:42 PM), http://www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2013/010.aspx.
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These “econometric allegories,” — as Alan Blinder and Ricardo Reis68
term them, evoking the persuasive labor that these narratives are called
upon to perform— draw on the full intellectual resources of these institu-
tions: the research acumen, the judgment, and the experience of their per-
sonnel.  They forecast economic and financial conditions over a time
horizon of approximately one to two years, along with an explanation of
how the respective bank’s interest policy will maintain consumer prices
within an inflation target range of 1%-3% (or around a single target, typi-
cally 2%).69
In the middle of the last decade, the curious nature of these routine
statements and the allegories they encompassed interested me.  I began to
view them as functioning in a manner that exceeded the requirements of an
inflation target per se; I became intrigued with how they served as vehicles
for modeling the economy communicatively.  Moreover, I gradually recog-
nized how various genres of the monetary policy story modeled those rela-
tionships that sustained a public currency.  As the research unfolded in
Wellington, Stockholm, London, Frankfurt, and Washington, the impera-
tive of a public currency gained increasingly precise articulation.70  There
was, however, earlier research focusing on another central bank that was
critical to the development of these ideas and insights.71
Creating the Monetary Policy Story
Examining the communicative practices operating within the Bank of
Canada, Graham Smart demonstrated how “storytelling” performs a deci-
sive and uncanny heuristic function.72  Smart provides a basic account of
the process of creating monetary policy stories:
The monetary-policy story is constructed in . . . stages, over time and across a
set of written genres, with each successive version offering a broader knowl-
edge claim in the form of a more comprehensive account of the state of the
Canadian economy.  The narrative appears [initially] . . . as a cluster of . . .
sector stories, specialists’ analyses of developments in different sectors of the
economy; in the [next] stage, as a more encompassing, although still some-
what circumscribed, narrative about the Canadian economy as a whole, pro-
duced by a team of economists during a quarterly activity known as the
Projection Exercise and inscribed in a document called the White
Book . . . .73
The storytelling exercise yields, as one Canadian executive put it, “an
68. Alan S. Blinder & Ricardo Reis, Understanding the Greenspan Standard 14 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of Kan. City, Symposium, 2005), available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publi-
cat/sympos/2005/pdf/blinderreis.paper.0804.pdf.
69. See, e.g., BANK OF ENG. supra note 67.
70. See HOLMES, supra note 6.
71. See Graham Smart, Storytelling in a Central Bank: The Role of Narrative in the
Creation and Use of Specialized Economic Knowledge, 13 J. OF BUS. & TECHNICAL COMM.
249, 249 (1999).
72. Id. at 251.
73. Id at 257.
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essential framework for thinking about the economy and about policy,”74
and the meetings associated with this exercise “provide regular occasions
for negotiating competing interpretations of empirical phenomena and sta-
tistical data.”75 Yet in its final manifestation, a monetary policy story “is
nowhere completely articulated in written form in any internal document;
rather, it resides in the executives’ discourse, surfacing in meetings and
informal conversation, in whole or in part, and underlying certain assump-
tions and lines of argument in the texts they produce.”76
These actors freely acknowledge storytelling as implicit in negotiating
various levels of formal empirical analysis, notably in reference to the
bank’s econometric model of the Canadian economy.77  Specifically, the
analytical discussions involved in the management of Bank of Canada’s
Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) foster the assimilation of “feelings,”
“intuition,” “discretion,” and “judgment” of bank personnel.78  Storytelling,
thus, draws on the reserves of “experience” that sustain the shared under-
standings that make possible the intellectual collaboration of the bank’s
economists.”79
A very similar, if not identical, storytelling unfolds in relation to the
RBNZ model, the Forecasting and Policy System (FPS), yielding a narrative
or narratives open to constant revision and modification as new data and
interpretative insights become available.80  In the first instance, the discus-
sions translate an essentially historical data series and re-articulates it in
the future tense as a representation of the evolution of economic activity,
notably of paths of economic output, employment, prices, interest rates,
and exchange rates.81  For example, these analytical practices yield a rela-
tively stable baseline scenario of the New Zealand economy— its “central
projections”— around which policymakers test and evaluate simulations
and a series of alternative policy actions.82  These evaluations provide
opportunities to explore feedback relations and reveal second-round
effects.
However, as I have shown, there is a parallel framework for generating
economic intelligence that is crucial in the crafting of the monetary policy
story.  For instance, former Governor Alan Bollard of the RBNZ was in the
“field” each month visiting a selection of 500 or more businesses across the
North and South Islands that provide strategic perspectives on the New
74. Id. at 263.
75. Id. at 265.
76. Id. at 266.
77. See id. at 251, 260.
78. Id. at 260– 62.
79. Id. at 258.
80. See generally Felix Delbru¨ck et al., The Evolution of the Forecasting and Policy Sys-
tem (FPS) at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Reserve Bank of N.Z., Discussion Paper
No. DP2008/19, 2008), available at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research_and_publica-
tions/discussion_papers/2008/dp08_19.pdf.
81. See id. at 5.
82. See generally John McDermott, Assistant Governor and Head of Econ., Reserve
Bank of N.Z.,  Address at Financial Services Institute of Australasia: The Role of Fore-
casting in Monetary Policy (Mar. 15, 2013).
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Zealand economy.83
During these visits, the governor and his staff communicated central
bank policies and actively solicited stories— anecdotal data— from the
employees, managers, and owners of these enterprises.84  They discussed
numerical data, not only contemporaneous reports on the New Zealand
economy, but the details and the contradictions that economic statistics
typically fail to capture.85  In these exchanges, they put words not only to
the ephemera of local expectations and sentiments, but also to the rapidly
changing competitive pressures unfolding in global markets, particularly
among New Zealand’s key trading partners.86  This network of interlocu-
tors provides technical representations of the New Zealand economy
imparting (or restoring) social mediation and social context to economic
analysis.87
These situated actors can narrate how shifts in exchange rates or the
prices of agricultural commodities and oil, impact the operation of a par-
ticular business.  These accounts translate the abstractions of price into
countless examples of situated social action and experience.  Dairy and
wool processors, vintners, tour operators, appliance manufacturers,
software engineers, real estate brokers, bank officers, trade union repre-
sentatives, managers of construction firms, and retail outlets all provide
social contextualization of economic facts for the governor.88  The future
continually encroaches on these narratives as projections of income,
expenditures, and, most significantly, in the articulation of plans for
employment and investment by these enterprises.  The RBNZ listed over
fifty companies and organizations it had consulted during a recent quar-
terly “projection round” while noting that it had established contact with
“other companies and organizations for feedback on business conditions
and particular issues relevant to our policy deliberations.”89  These inter-
locutors were simultaneously the source of bank intelligence and the pri-
mary audience for bank communication.
The analytical scenarios that emerge from within and outside the bank
undergo a two-fold interpretive process.  First, they are recast as essentially
83. See, RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 2007 36– 37
(2007), available at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/monetary_policy_state-
ment/2007/sep07.pdf.
84. See Nick Smyth, A Profile of the NZ Dollar Foreign Exchange Market, 70 RESERVE
BANK OF N.Z. BULL 5 (2007).
85. See id.
86. See generally RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT, DECEMBER
2009 (2009), available at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/monetary_policy_
statement/2009/dec09.pdf.
87. See HOLMES, supra note 6, at 163– 66.
88. Holmes, supra note 20, at 400.
89. RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 2005 35 (2005),
available at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/monetary_policy_statement/
2005/sep05.pdf.
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an argument or arguments for a specific policy stance.90  A small group of
senior officials, including members of the MPC and the smaller Official
Cash Rate Decision Group (ODG), interpret econometric projections and
other data and information, refining them for the purposes of advising the
Governor on the setting of the bank’s policy rate, the Official Cash Rate
(OCR).91  Second, they are re-articulated as a public statement composed
for the purposes of shaping and anchoring expectations on the evolution of
prices.92  An even smaller group of advisors assisted Governor Bollard in
drafting these public communications.93  These individuals craft and edit
these statements, and generally oversee the rhetorical expertise of a central
bank.94
The “Policy Assessment,” issued every six weeks by the RBNZ in sup-
port of its decision on interest rates represents a key example of these com-
munications.95  In the example that follows, the explanation of the bank’s
interest rate decision— the RBNZ’s OCR— was made as the financial turmoil
that commenced in August 2007 was gaining visibility and assuming
urgency.96  Notably, the central bank decided not to alter interest rates;
crucially, however, the language that the bank employed to model the eco-
nomic situation was beginning to shift in anticipation of new sources of
risk and uncertainty.97  The authors of the statement were searching for
narrative forms and descriptive conventions that could begin to address
and explain the nature of what we know now was an impending debacle:98
Monetary Policy Statement, September 2007— Policy Assessment:
The Official Cash Rate (OCR) will remain unchanged at 8.25 percent. . . .
The outlook for economic activity and inflation has become more uncertain
since we reviewed the OCR in July. Credit concerns and heightened risk
aversion have led to significant turbulence in global financial markets. This
development increases the likelihood of a weaker economic outlook for the
United States and New Zealand’s other key trading partners than in recent
forecasts.
The consequences of this financial market turmoil for New Zealand remain
unclear at this stage. However, we continue to expect a significant boost to
the economy over the next two years from the sharp rise in world prices for
dairy products and some other commodities that has occurred over the past
year. A sharp decline in the New Zealand dollar since July, if sustained, will
act to reinforce the effects of higher world prices on export sector revenues.
Recent inflation outcomes have highlighted widespread inflation pressures
but indicators in recent weeks suggest that previous increases in the OCR
90. See generally The Monetary Policy Decision-Making Process, RESERVE BANK OF
N.Z., http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/about_monetary_policy/0096438.pdf
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
91. Id. See also ALAN BOLLARD & SARAH GAITONOS, CRISIS: ONE CENTRAL BANK GOVER-
NOR AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 38– 39 (2010).
92. See The Monetary Policy Decision-Making Process, supra note 90, at 4
93. Id. at 4.
94. See id. at 4.
95. See The Monetary Policy Decision-Making Process, supra note 90 at 4. R
96. See BOLLARD & GAITONOS, supra note 91, at 29. R
97. See generally RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., supra note 89. R
98. See generally BOLLARD & GAITONOS, supra note 91. R
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are starting to dampen domestic spending, which will help to reduce those
pressures. In particular, household borrowing growth is beginning to slow
and turnover in the housing market continues to fall.
We expect the effects of stronger export revenues on activity and inflation to
be broadly offset by a further braking effect from the interest rate increases
undertaken earlier this year. However, in the short-term, CPI inflation is
likely to rise due to the effects of a lower exchange rate and higher food
prices. It is important that this temporary increase in inflation does not
affect price- or wage-setting behaviour in the medium term.
The recent collapse of a number of finance companies and reduced liquidity
within the non-bank lending institution sector generally could further act to
dampen activity in some areas of the economy, such as property develop-
ment or consumer financing. However, we currently expect those negative
effects to be relatively contained.
At this point, we believe that the current level of the OCR is consistent with
future inflation outcomes of 1 to 3 percent on average over the medium
term. However, given greater than usual uncertainty at present, we will be
watching to see how the upside and downside risks to the outlook are
developing.99
In this brief passage, the governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
captures the remarkably complex pricing phenomena he is charged with
managing.  At the outset, the central bank’s intention is established— that
is, to conduct “open-market operations” in a manner that will keep a key
short-term interest rate, the OCR, at a specific level (8.25%).100  In Septem-
ber 2007, this central bank policy rate was one of the highest in the
world.101  The body of Governor Bollard’s text concisely explains the mon-
etary policy stance in relation to prevailing conditions in New Zealand and
across the globe during an unusually tumultuous period for financial
markets.102
Implicit in the statement is an underlying commitment to the open
communication of the bank’s policy, the clarity in explaining the analysis
upon which the policy stance is based, and the candor in assessing the
elements of uncertainty and risk in the assessment.103  The statement reit-
erates the specific inflation target that the RBNZ is committed to achieving,
and thus makes the benchmark for assessing the bank’s performance
explicit and establishes measures of accountability for its governor.104  The
Governors’ Policy Assessment prefaces a longer document, the Monetary
99. See RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., supra note 83, at 2.
100. See id.
101. Compare Official Cash Rate (OCR) decisions and current rate, RESERVE BANK OF
N.Z., http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/ocr/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (show-
ing New Zealand’s OCR, or central bank rate in 2007), with Cash Rate Target Interest
Rate Changes, RESERVE BANK OF AUSTL., http://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/cash-rate/cash-
rate-2002-2007.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (showing Australia’s Central Bank Rate
in 2007).
102. See RESERVE BANK OF N.Z. supra note 83.
103. BLINDER, supra note 4; see also ALAN BLINDER ET AL., HOW DO CENTRAL BANKS
TALK?: GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY (BOOK 3) 1 (2001); Alan Blinder et al.,
What We Know and What We Would Like to Know About Central Bank Communication,
VOX (May 15, 2008), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/1143.
104. See generally RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., supra note 83.
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Policy Statement, that, again, under the sway of transparency, describes in
considerable detail the economic analyses and projections that inform the
current assessment as well as those that are likely to influence future pol-
icy developments.105
However, a distinctive aspect of the New Zealand inflation-targeting
regime is highlighted when the governor drafts the document entirely on
his own during particularly important junctures, such as the financial cri-
sis of 2008.106  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989 established
the current monetary framework, and vested an unusual degree of opera-
tional independence and personal accountability with the governor.107
Put bluntly, a single individual was made personally accountable for the
futurity of prices within an economy at large.  Not only does this frame-
work endow the economy with a reflexive voice, it personifies that voice in
the person of the Reserve Bank Governor.
During my fieldwork in late 2008 and early 2009, I became increas-
ingly interested in how these allegories assumed far greater importance as
central bank personnel grappled analytically with some of the most vexing
problems in macroeconomics.  I observed first in Wellington and then in
Stockholm, how personnel faced a double challenge at the outset of the
financial crisis.  They not only had to draw on state of the art ideas in
academic economics for their technical insights, but also had to craft their
solutions in a manner that made them plausible to the public central bank
personnel, who needed a solution that could be coherently communicated
to the public in order to yield effective policy.  This maneuver presumed
very important shifts, by which economic actors came to be conceived of as
thinking and reflexive subjects who are capable of employing theory and
parsing the ambiguities of data and the anomalies of information.108
Ecology of Discourses
In the following statement— a policy assessment of a mere 233 words—
Governor Bollard’s analysis shifts markedly as consumer prices in June
2008 were projected to significantly exceed the inflation targets as estab-
lished in the Policy Targets Agreement (PTA), the formal agreement signed
by the Governor and Minister of Finance committing the bank to explicit
consumer price inflation targets.109  The bank’s policy rate was main-
tained at the 8.25% level, as it had been for almost a year.110  However, yet
again, the econometric drama was re-scripted, and the ecology of dis-
105. See generally id.
106. Interview with Alan Bollard, Governor, Reserve Bank of N.Z. .
107. See Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989, §§ 9, 11, 41 (N.Z.).
108. See also HIROKAZU MIYAZAKI, ARBITRAGING JAPAN: DREAMS OF CAPITALISM AT THE
END OF FINANCE 68 (2013).
109. See RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT, JUNE 2008 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary_policy/monetary_policy_statement/2008/
jun08.pdf.
110. Id.
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courses that the RBNZ employed to model the situation linguistically and
anchor expectations acquired new rhetorical urgency:
Monetary Policy Statement, June 2008— Policy Assessment:
The global economy is currently experiencing significant increases in oil
and food prices.  These price increases are occurring at the same time as
activity is weakening in many economies in response to the global credit
crisis and slowing housing markets.  In New Zealand, this confluence of fac-
tors is producing a challenging environment of weak activity and high
inflation.
We project annual CPI inflation to peak at 4.7 percent in the September
quarter of this year.  Although much of this reflects higher food and energy
prices, underlying inflation pressure also remains persistent.  Nevertheless,
we do still expect inflation to return comfortably inside the target band over
the medium term.  This is based on the expectation that commodity prices
stop rising, inflation expectations remain anchored, and weakening eco-
nomic activity contributes to an easing in non-tradable inflation.
The outlook for economic activity is now weaker than in our previous State-
ment.  We project little GDP growth over 2008, and only a modest recovery
thereafter, largely reflecting a weaker household sector.  Government spend-
ing and personal tax cuts will provide some offset to this lower growth but
will also add to medium-term inflation pressure.
Consistent with the Policy Targets Agreement, the Bank’s focus will remain
on medium-term inflation.  Provided the economy evolves in line with our
projection, we are now likely to be in a position to lower the OCR later this
year, which is sooner than previously envisaged.111
GDP growth was projected to be minimal, the exchange rate of the
New Zealand dollar was expected to depreciate, housing prices appeared to
be falling, and the labor market was understood to be weakening.112  This
appraisal of economic conditions allowed the Reserve Bank to “look
through” the first-round price effects of inflationary shocks— projected to
spike to 4.7% in the following quarter— and project that the rate of con-
sumer price inflation would return to the target band of 1%-3% in the
medium term of the Bank’s three-year projection period.113 The bank’s
tight monetary policy was pushing the economy to the brink of recession.
The grim sequelae of economic shocks— the credit crunch, the deflating of
the housing bubble, and the rising prices of commodities— were projected
by the bank to resolve the inflation situation by virtue of an economic
slowdown, if not recession, in New Zealand and globally.114
The econometric re-scripting required, however, an agile articulation
of the bank’s intentions vis-a`-vis the evolution of expectations.  The bank is
explicit in the statement appended to the Governor’s Policy Assessment
regarding its intention to shape pricing behavior, as follows:
In these instances, a key to ensuring that medium-term inflation remains
anchored at low levels is that those wage and price setters do not alter their
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 18 29-MAY-14 10:17
32 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
pricing behaviours in response to these near-term cost shocks.  However, if
firms and workers start negotiating prices and wages on the expectation
that inflation at or above 3 percent is the norm, then the Bank would have to
respond with higher interest rates than assumed here.  Leaving such beha-
viour unchecked indefinitely would encourage many of the inefficiencies
that persistently high inflation brings with it, such as distorting price sig-
nals and disadvantaging low or fixed-income households.115
The Bank thus communicates its intentions unambiguously.  But why
should the story be believed?  Why is it credible?
In a highlighted section of the statement, with the heading “The Policy
Target Agreement, and maintaining price stability in trying times,” the
RBNZ reaffirms the intellectual premise of its monetary regime.116  At the
moment when it is anticipated that the CPI target would be violated, a
pedagogic opportunity arises, allowing the bank to model explicitly and
transparently the rationale guiding policies and the practices of its
personnel:
It is at times like the present, faced with significant cost shocks, that the PTA
is particularly valuable.  By specifying an agreed medium-term inflation tar-
get, which firms and households can count on being achieved in the
medium term, it also provides the scope for us to accommodate temporary
deviations from the target— even quite large ones at times.  Without the
medium-term target, firms and households would have little basis for know-
ing where future inflation would settle.117
Monetary policy must, in this view, appeal to reflexive subjects inhabiting
farms, firms, and households, recruiting them to participate in the anchor-
ing of expectations.  This entails subtle messages about the nature of time,
the structure of motive, and the ability of the bank to influence prices in
the medium term:
The PTA also explicitly notes that there is a range of events, whose impact on
the inflation rate would normally be temporary, that could cause actual CPI
inflation to deviate from medium-term trend inflation.  The implicit direc-
tive of the PTA is to “look through” such events and focus on medium-term
trend inflation, or what is sometimes called core inflation.  The implication
of the PTA is that when inflation is outside the target range it is important to
have a credible plan to return to target over a long-enough horizon such that
the economy does not suffer from unnecessary instability.118
This lesson can be agonizing.  New Zealanders were being asked to
restrain their expectations— foregoing, notably, demands for higher
wages— at a time when many of them were being squeezed, if not over-
whelmed, by pricing pressures.119  They, the public, were being asked to
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See OLIVIER J. BLANCHARD AND JORDI GALI´, CENTER. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL. POL’Y
RESEARCH, THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF OIL PRICE SHOCKS: WHY ARE THE 2000S SO
DIFFERENT FROM THE 1970S? (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publica-
tions/workingpapers/2007-011.pdf.
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trust in the efficacy of monetary policy and contingencies of monetary the-
ory to moderate inflation in the future:
We will generally look through the first-round effects of relative price move-
ments on CPI inflation (such as the effects of the oil price rise on domestic
petrol prices).  This is the case even if these movements are persistent and
evolve over a number of years.  However, we will respond to any impact of
relative price movement on inflation expectations and demand pressure.
This follows the general principle that monetary policy cannot prevent rela-
tive price movements in the economy— because these are real phenomena—
but monetary policy should focus on the underlying rate of inflation.120
Thus, at the time when the quantitative target was breached the
econometric allegory became the means for negotiating the complex rhe-
torical challenge of reshaping expectations pedagogically.  The intellectual
and institutional credibility of the bank was brought to bear on behavior in
an effort to persuade New Zealanders to remain steadfast in their role as
central bankers unto themselves.
Underwriting Confidence
“We also put a great deal of pedagogic effort to it all.”
Lars Heikensten, Governor of the Riksbank (2003– 2005)121
When I visited the Swedish central bank in 2009, the prevailing chal-
lenge for it, and for virtually all central banks globally, was underwriting
confidence.122  Inflation targeting was re-functioned for this purpose.123
Its communicative conventions— and specifically the status of the mone-
tary policy story— assumed an overriding importance as the exigencies of
monetary policy and financial stability converged.124  Rather than merely
anchoring expectations about a price target, the communicative protocols
were realigned to address the spectrum of sentiments and expectations that
can underwrite or undercut public confidence.125  Controlling the parame-
ters of the monetary policy story and communicating them with care and
circumspection was of the utmost importance.  The Minutes of the bank’s
Executive Board meeting in April 2009, published within two weeks of the
120. RESERVE BANK OF N.Z., supra note 109, at 7.
121. GUNNAR WETTERBERG, MONEY AND POWER: FROM STOCKHOLMS BANCO 1656 TO
SVERIGES RIKSBANK TODAY 460 (Patrick Hort, trans., 2009).
122. See generally EDWIN LE HERON, FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CONFIDENCE IN A POST-KEYNE-
SIAN STOCK FLOW CONSISTENT MODEL (2009) (explaining how the financial crisis in the
United States lead to decreased confidence generally in the Euro Zone banking system,
particularly in the French system).
123. See BEN S. BERNANKE ET AL., INFLATION TARGETING: FROM THE INTERNATIONAL EXPE-
RIENCE 120 (2001) (illustrating one example where inflation-reduction targets were used
to buttress a central bank’s commitment to price stability and increase public confi-
dence in the central banking decisions.  Further, the bank itself hoped that announcing
inflation targets would eventually strengthen confidence in monetary policy, allowing
for inflation control with increased transparency and accountability).
124. See Holmes, supra note 20, at 389.
125. See id. at 406– 07.
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gathering, were unusually expressive.126  No particular data series, no par-
ticular variables were decisive in their deliberations; rather, members care-
fully contextualized the overall economic situation as a framework for
modeling and, thus, instilling confidence.127
Within the microcosm of the bank boardroom, the macrocosms of the
Swedish and global economy emerged with discernable features via a care-
fully orchestrated conversation among six individuals.128  Belief and its
absence were simulated as participants evaluated monetary predicaments
for themselves and vicariously for a diverse audience.129  The members of
the Board were acutely aware that with each statement— with what was spo-
ken and what was left unspoken— they were engaged in a deliberative pro-
cess that served a profound purpose.130
Deputy Governor Lars Svensson set the tone at the outset of the con-
versation with his review of “economic developments abroad,” as summa-
rized in the minutes:
Svensson opened the discussion.  He noted that the picture of developments
abroad is very gloomy.  Mr. Svensson agreed with the view of international
developments presented in the draft Monetary Policy Update.  The forecasts
for the real economy and inflation abroad have been revised down since the
previous monetary policy meeting in February.  Mr. Svensson considered
that many indicators of global economic developments were now showing a
similar course to that at the beginning of the Great Depression, which gave
cause for concern.131
Economic forecasts were being revised downward and a precise assessment
of the global economy was, at best, difficult.132  Each member of the com-
mittee sought nonetheless to give a tentative narrative structure to the eco-
nomic predicaments facing the global economy.133  The commentary was
restrained and matter of fact, and yet an unmistakable drama lurked in
each intervention, as participants searched for a means to articulate a
coherent and a responsible narrative.134
Lars Nyberg’s survey of conditions followed the appraisal outlined in
the Monetary Policy Update:
Deputy Governor Lars Nyberg essentially shared the gloomy view of interna-
tional developments.  World trade has continued to fall heavily.  Capital
inflows to most emerging economies have largely ceased. Unemployment
has reached all-time highs in many countries and is expected to increase
further.  No positive signs can be seen in Europe.135
126. See SVERIGES RIKSBANK, supra note 19.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
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Nyberg described a general scenario by which financial markets could be
reanimated, if and when the appetite for risk returned:
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September last year, risk
propensity among investors in credit instruments declined dramatically.
There is now substantial liquidity in many funds, hedge funds and insur-
ance companies.  This liquidity is waiting to be invested.  At the same time
there are companies with essentially sound conditions that will survive the
crisis, and these need funding.  This applies to both financial and non-finan-
cial companies.  When investors are willing to begin taking slightly more
risk again and companies realise that they will have to pay slightly higher
interest rates, the market will slowly rise back on its feet.136
Nyberg added that these positive circumstances would in all likelihood
begin to surface even as the economic downturn continued to worsen:
It is therefore not unreasonable that the credit markets should come to life at
the same time as the credit losses in the banks are growing and the economic
downturn is continuing. . . .  Companies with good credit ratings are now
able to borrow.  Other markets where activity has been almost non-existent
since September last year have also begun to slowly come back to life.137
Deputy Governor Karolina Ekholm reiterated the nature of the chal-
lenges for Swedish trade and the degree to which the fate of Sweden was
tethered to economic conditions in Europe and the US:
Ekholm shared the gloomy view and did not in principle envisage any rays
of light. . . . Experiences from the 1930s show that a deep recession can
involve temporary upturns.  In addition, the real economic downturn in the
United States is continuing, with falling employment and increased
unemployment.
Developments in Europe appear to be following the same patterns as in the
United States, though with some time lag.  A recovery in the United States is
to be expected before a recovery in Europe. The problems in the German
economy are troublesome for Sweden, which is strongly dependent on trade
with Germany.  Sweden risks facing a long period of weak demand for
export goods.138
Svante O¨berg, who holds the position of first deputy governor,
endorsed the staff analysis presented in the draft Monetary Policy Update,
while asserting that the risks to the forecasts were for further downward
revisions.139  He further elaborated on the synchronized nature of the
global downturn and referred to an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
report on how these events have historically played out:
According to the IMF, the current financial crisis will probably result in an
unusually long and deep recession as a result of the financial and global
nature of the crisis.  The IMF bases its analysis on earlier recessions in 21
developed countries since 1960.  Its conclusion is that recessions associated
with financial crises tend to be more serious and that the recoveries tend to
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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be slower than normal.  If the recessions are moreover globally syn-
chronised, they tend to be even longer and to be followed by even weaker
recoveries. . . .
Expectations are largely in line with the average of the five large financial
crises in the industrial world during the post-war period (the big five) and
moreover in line with the average for recessions associated with financial
crises and synchronised recessions, according to the IMF.140
Governor Stefan Ingves drew attention to the coordination among
monetary authorities globally:
The authorities in different countries have taken a large number of conven-
tional and non-conventional policy measures.  One important question is
whether this can reduce pessimism and infuse new confidence in the future.
With all of the measures that have now been taken, the world economy is
not facing a financial meltdown.  The financial system is functioning tolera-
bly, but only as the result of massive public sector support measures.141
He then emphasized the problems of contagion globally and the risk of a
very slow and uneven recovery from the crisis:
But the risks remain in international terms with regard to self-reinforcing
contagion effects between weak real economies and under-capitalised finan-
cial systems.  In addition, the collapse in world trade is continuing.  When
trade credits are frozen, this disturbs the global supply chain of input goods
needed before a product is ready for sale.  In addition to declining demand,
world trade is also therefore hit by supply shocks related to funding
problems.  Moreover, previous experiences show that the process of adjust-
ment risks becoming long drawn-out, particularly in countries where saving
has been low for a long time before the adjustment begins.  Countries have
different capacities and willingness to resolve problems in the financial sec-
tor; countries have also been hit by greater or smaller declines in export
demand.  This should mean that when economic activity improves, it will
not be in an entirely synchronised manner.142
Deputy Governor Barbro Wickman-Parak returned to the draft Mone-
tary Policy Statement, agreeing with the modestly positive forecast of recov-
ery it projected; she also allowed for the possibility of a more positive
economic outcome and a more rapid restoration of confidence:
The further ahead one looks, the more uncertain the forecasts are, of course.
This is always the case, but the uncertainty is particularly great on this occa-
sion for several reasons.  The effects of the expansionary fiscal policy are
uncertain and it is extremely difficult to assess when the normalisation of
the financial markets will begin and confidence will be restored.
Although Ms. Wickman-Parak supported the forecast in the main scenario in
the February Report, she considered then that there was reason to pay atten-
tion to the alternative scenario based on a more rapid recovery abroad and
she also wished to highlight this possibility today.  The motive for this is, as
in February, that the financial system is undergoing a massive confidence
crisis that has made a lasting impression on the real economy.  Once confi-
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
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dence is restored, an upturn may be stronger than expected.143
Finally, Wickman-Parak reiterated how confidence would reassert itself
over time as the outlines of a discernable future became visible and plausi-
ble in people’s daily lives.144 The global efforts to address the crisis and the
cooperation among global central banks created the field upon which these
kinds of scenarios could be built.145
The members of the board listened carefully to each other and crafted
their interventions in a manner that allowed for conflicting perspectives,
differing emphases, and alternative interpretations, in which uncertainty
and indeterminacy were essential and inevitable conditions.146  They were
fully aware of the media, of various levels of public- and private-sector man-
agers, of political officials, of market participants, and of the public in gen-
eral.147  Not insignificantly, they were also aware that employees of the
bank itself would overhear, as it were, their conversations.148  They sought
to anticipate the questions of these target groups in order to speak to their
motives and their expectations.149
Central bank credibility was not conveyed by a technocratic official-
dom whose knowledge, expertise, and judgment were, a priori, “superior,”
and hence worthy of trust; rather, authority emerged from complex narra-
tives by which policymakers crafted statements that addressed coherently
the concerns of diverse and dynamic public interests.150  These narratives
simulated the substantive experience of the bank’s target groups.151  The
story, as we have seen in this case, was far from salutary or uplifting;
rather, its persuasive aim was to foster economic stability by providing the
analytical material with which firms and households could address the
shifting challenges of the present situation.  The task demanded the ampli-
fication of communicative protocols of the inflation-targeting regime, par-
ticularly by foregrounding the monetary policy story and the conversations
that generated and sustained it.152
A key task of this storytelling was to stabilize sentiments and expecta-
tions but not fully or necessarily to eradicate fear.  Fear and uncertainty
were entirely appropriate elements of the story at that time.  But board
members needed a story that would both evoke a broad range of more
nuanced sentiment and expectation, and bear on the particular circum-
stances that prevailed in early 2009.  The experience and judgment of
board members was key to providing interpretative insights on the availa-
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Holmes, supra note 20.
146. See SVERIGES RIKSBANK April 20, 2009, supra note 19. R
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See MICHAEL WOODFORD, INTEREST & PRICES FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF MONE-
TARY POLICY 2– 3 (2003).
151. See id.
152. See SVERIGES RIKSBANK April 20, 2009, supra note 19. R
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ble data— data that were unusually difficult to read at the time.153  Signifi-
cantly, board members recapitulated the history of similar crises and the
ways other countries had resolved them.154  Casting the monetary policy
story prospectively was decisive.  The board members rendered the issues
at the heart of the crisis tractable by teasing out readings of the current
circumstances that were consistent with information, judgment, and expe-
rience.  Moreover, when rational appraisals of risk and rewards were
largely or entirely incalculable, the board members’ forward-looking
appraisals were capable of orchestrating those leaps of faith by which the
investment, employment, and consumption plans of firms and households
could become the basis of action in the face of uncertainty.
Four broad issues emerged from my work in Stockholm that became
decisive in shaping my subsequent research.  Each issue revealed the
deeper and broader communicative issues at stake in the management of a
public currency:
(1) In the midst of the crisis, the evolving monetary story became the means
for shaping public perceptions of shared predicaments in a manner that
made them recognizable and plausible.  The storytelling was attuned to
the diverse affective predispositions of the Swedish people.
(2) By controlling the parameters of this narrative genre, the Riksbank
board created an analytical account that could stabilize portrayals of the
future with the capacity to act upon features prospectively.  Representa-
tions of the future were radically and explicitly performative.  Members
of the board sought to create expectations and “structures of feeling”155
and, thereby, affectively model the future as an empirical fact.
(3) The bank’s economic and monetary expertise— its research capabili-
ties— fully registers at every turn in the board’s deliberation.  What
made the research persuasive was, ironically, the candid appraisal of the
limitations of data and the acknowledgment of the uncertainties sur-
rounding the economic theory.  The board demarked the threshold, and
it was largely a leap of faith that impelled action across it.  The bank had
more than mere information to offer; it had a relationship with the pub-
lic, cultivated for decades, that was decisive in summoning the ephem-
eral elements of confidence in the face of indeterminacy.
(4) The basis of this communicative relationship was rooted in the creative
field of economic action.  Insofar as the members of the Riksbank’s exec-
utive board were deeply engaged in conversations with networks of
interlocutors, they sought to operate fully in concert with the public,
fully wired into their communicative field, and fully aware of their
unfolding dilemmas.  The troubled economy and the dysfunctional
financial system assumed the guise of shared predicaments, which the
Riksbank’s board understood were ultimately in the hands, the visible
hands, of its target groups— the public— to creatively resolve.
The continual articulation of policy decisions, in terms of first
acknowledging the challenges facing consumers and producers and then
narrating these challenges back in a manner that can speak to the Swedish
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 157– 64. R
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people, distinguishes this monetary regime.  The public interest is, thus,
framed and reframed within a persuasive monetary policy story that
acknowledges the unfolding predicaments of firms, households, and indi-
viduals.  Neither fiat nor reserves of precious metals underwrite the Krona;
rather, through the communicative apparatus, the Bank fashions narratives
from information, data, intelligence, and experience that can orchestrate
policy by means of a carefully crafted conversation.
Growth Story
It has been usual to think of the accumulated wealth of the world as having
been painfully built up out of that voluntary abstinence of individuals from
the immediate enjoyment of consumption which we call Thrift.  But . . . mere
abstinence is not enough by itself to build cities or drain fens . . . .  It is
enterprise which builds and improves the world’s possessions . . . .  If enter-
prise is afoot, wealth accumulates whatever may be happening to Thrift; and
if Enterprise is asleep, wealth decays whatever Thrift may be doing.156
John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money
The pre-monetary policy meeting of the Bank of England that I
attended in early July 2011 illuminated a central preoccupation of my
research, notably the problem of uncertainty and its relationship to the
representational nature of the monetary policy story.  A year earlier in
Stockholm, I had begun to think of the conditions of a liquidity trap as a
profound metaphorical problem whereby ideas could be frozen as a func-
tion of uncertainty.  And, relatedly, I began to wonder how, as Robert
Skidelsky has put it, “uncertainty is generated by the system itself.”157
During this period, the Bank of England and other major central banks
faced a classic impasse in which the data were conflicting and confidence
subdued or absent.158  The impasse had an “empirical” basis: banks were
not lending to consumers,159 businesses were not borrowing,160 and
growth was faltering.161
Liquidity trap— as a metaphor— seemed to color just about everything
that the presenters discussed.  It was as if the term ceased to merely
describe the circumstances of borrowers and lenders and began to signify a
wider, perhaps pervasive, predicament.  Uncertainty trapped thought and
action more broadly, further clarifying, inter alia, the meaning of the Japa-
nese “lost decade.”  Lost were the firm grounds upon which to isolate and
address policy issues with sustainable interventions.  Relationships
between variables were difficult to discern, analysis was unusually tenta-
tive, and forecasting was becoming increasingly perilous.  Policy formula-
tion was troubled, not least because there was doubt about what
156. John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Money, in VI THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 3, 148– 49 (1971).
157. ROBERT SKIDELSKY, KEYNES: THE RETURN OF THE MASTER 84 (2009).
158. See, e.g., Bank of England 2011 Minutes, supra note 18, ¶ 21. R
159. See, e.g., id. ¶ 14.
160. See, e.g., id.
161. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 19, 27.
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conventional monetary policy could achieve under these circumstances.
This condition of instability, however, posed a wider predicament.  Insofar
as the Bank of England’s capacity to project a persuasive story about the
future had been degraded, planning and action were frustrated, if not
foreclosed.
Chris Piper delivered the penultimate presentation of the pre-MPC
meeting on behalf of the banks’ agents.  As he spoke, I was reminded of our
conversation the day earlier, in which Mr. Piper had described the circum-
stances of a medium-sized electronics firm in his region.  What crossed my
mind will hardly surprise the reader.  The majority of the issues presented
in the meeting expressed the ongoing concerns of Mr. Piper’s business con-
tacts in central-southern England.  The issues raised in the meeting as
more-or-less discrete analytical matters had already been incorporated in
the pragmatic work, the cognitive labor of these contacts by which they
planned and managed the day-to-day operations of their diverse enter-
prises.  The fate of Greek bonds may not have been a pressing concern, but
many of the other macroeconomic and monetary issues— the conditions in
domestic and international markets, shifts in taxation policy, movements
in exchange rates, and the cost and availability of credit— were fully within
the intellectual ambit of business people and consumers.  The contacts,
however, couched these issues in the routine measures by which they main-
tained the viability of their respective businesses.  They applied purposeful
intelligence on the micro level to the basic issues (and many others)
examined in the pre-MPC meeting, and they generated solutions— some
successfully, some not.  However severe the challenges, some firms were
doing well; indeed, some were doing phenomenally well.  Micro-level action
in the face of a liquidity trap, insofar as it succeeded in generating growth
for particular firms in the face of numerous impediments, could have incre-
mental effects potentially solving the issues of the macro-level recovery.
But, these solutions were, at the time, idiosyncratic; they did not yield a
growth story.
It was not merely that the agents’ contacts were positioned in ways that
afforded them a closely textured purview on the situation they were operat-
ing in, a purview that might be relevant to the MPC; rather, it was that
they— the network of contacts— were crafting understanding of their situa-
tions in order to act in and upon them. The contacts were continually
engaged in developing strategic solutions to essentially the same situations
confronting the committee.  In their decisions to expand or curtail pay-
rolls, to increase or decrease investment, to borrow or lend, to adjust wages
or to modify prices, the contacts were addressing the substantive issues of
the UK economy in vivo, in real time.  These economic actors were continu-
ally experimenting with representational strategies that bridged
microeconomic and macroeconomic issues, thus endowing the future with
strategic attributes, however tentative, that they could act upon in the face
of the challenges and uncertainties posed by a persistent global slowdown.
By means that were not fully or necessarily visible in the interplay of con-
ventional aggregate data, the contacts were addressing and potentially
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resolving the circumstances of the recovery.  In their ability to access the
managerial strategies by which firms analyze information and deploy
resources, the members of the MPC had within their reach a means to tap
into the creative acumen of the network.  The question was how to make
these strategies and the insights underpinning them informative as a basis
for policy.
Again, a liquidity trap as an intellectual impasse can be disrupted, if
not resolved, by representational labor that creates a viable “growth story.”
There is an obvious analogue in the work of venture capitalists.  Kaushik
Sunder Rajan has posed this as the classic challenge and opportunity, nota-
bly for venture capitalists working in genomic sciences.162  These venture
capitalists must negotiate the predicaments of finance with a promissory
vision of financial payoff (if not windfall), an agile narrative designed to
disrupt established metaphors and tropes and create new ones often with
little in the way of “solid empirical data.”163  This kind of representational
labor drives enterprise and innovation.
The participants in the pre-MPC meeting understood and/or hoped
that representational enterprise was afoot by which an escape from a
liquidity trap was potentially in the works, and they sought to capture its
emergent motifs, to interpret its features, and to shape its future course.
They knew, too, that there were sectors or subsectors of the UK economy
where a persuasive growth story eroded the liquidity trap, by re-endowing
the future with features that can animate the leaps of faith that drive
innovation.
What I overheard at the pre-MPC meeting had to do with the unfin-
ished and or unacknowledged nature of a public currency provoked by a
liquidity trap.  What was entrapped was a growth story.  Fiscal austerity—
thrift— pursued by the British government was explicitly about the curtail-
ment or withdrawal of a promissory agenda in the name of budgetary
responsibility and financial probity: values, as J.M. Keynes suggests, that
do not in themselves contribute to the building of cities, draining fens, or
for that matter, writing software code.164  So what I began to understand
during this period was that the monetary story was about promises, about
negotiating and re-negotiating an evolving social contract, a series of eco-
nomic and monetary interests that can speak to the predicaments of the
public.  If austerity is allowed to usurp the representational labor under-
writing growth stories, wealth will decay.
During the summer of 2012, representational enterprise on a heroic
scale was afoot across the English Channel that could model anew the euro
as a public currency by means of a promissory vision.  Meanwhile, Britain
162. SUNDER RAJAN, supra note 10. R
163. Id.
164. Keynes, supra note 156, at 148– 150 (arguing that austerity and thrift do not R
underwrite growth, nor can they resolve the predicaments posed by an economic
slump).
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continued to lurch in and out of recession as enterprise slumbered.165
Manifesto for a Public Currency
“[C]ommitment to monetary stability is not only grounded in its economic
merits but is also a cornerstone of the social contract.”166
Benoˆıt Cœure´, member of the executive board of the
European Central Bank, March 2, 2013
In mid-2012, the technocratic challenge for the European Union
matched the scale and historical significance of the Cold War challenges
confronted by the original architects of the European project.  However,
rather than pooling national sovereignty by means of new supranational
institutions— the classic agenda of European integration— the emerging
challenge was to transform the nature of public finance in order to restore
and strengthen the viability of the European social model.167  In other
words, the crisis was provoking and then catalyzing a re-design of finance
and political economy to underwrite the other great project of European
integration, the project of solidarity.168
The sovereign debt crisis that began with revelations about Greek defi-
cits in early 2010 had quickly expanded to a massive upheaval that
threatened the financial stability of the entire euro area and, ultimately, the
overall performance of the global economy.169  In the ensuing sixteen
months, in what appeared to be an unending series of emergency meetings
in Brussels, Frankfurt, Athens, Berlin, Paris, and Washington, senior offi-
cials designed and debated interventions to address the quickening emer-
gency that seemed to continually outpace and thwart institutional
solutions.170  Not since the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 have such
intense, fractious, and brutal negotiations on the fate of Europe been pur-
sued, with these recent deliberations marked by a similar degree of miscal-
culation, deception, and with what many viewed as incandescent bad
165. See David Milliken & William Schomberg, Britain’s Double Dip Recession Revised
Away, but Picture Still Grim, REUTERS, June 27, 2013, available at http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2013/06/27/uk-gdp-data-idUKLNE95Q00P20130627.
166. Benoˆıt Cœure´, Member, Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Revisiting the Euro-
pean Social Contract, Keynote Address at the European Conference at Harvard: Europe
2.0— Taking the Next Step (Mar. 2, 2013), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
key/date/2013/html/sp130302.en.html.
167. See also Teodoro Dario Togati, Europe in Crisis: More Political Integration in the
Eurozone is the Solution, in EUROPE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 91, 98– 99 (Pompeo Della
Posta & Leila Simona Talani eds., 2011) (“[T]o overcome this suboptimal scenario and
grow at a more reasonable pace the Eurozone calls for higher political integration.”).
168. See DOUGLAS R. HOLMES, INTEGRAL EUROPE: FAST-CAPITALISM, MULTICULTURALISM,
NEOFASCISM 40– 41 (2000); PAUL RABINOW, FRENCH MODERN: NORMS AND FORMS OF THE
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 184– 87 (1989).
169. See also Landon Thomas Jr., Europeans Fear Greek Debt Crisis Will Spread, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/global/28euro.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
170. See also Steven Erlanger & Matthew Saltmarsh, Greek Debt Crisis Raises Doubts
About the European Union, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/
08/world/europe/08europe.html.
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faith.171
I asserted at the outset of this article that my purpose is not to recount
the intricacies of this debacle, but rather to examine what is emerging from
it.  I address this issue by focusing on what appears to be yet another pro-
saic account of a central banker.  Yet this account was unusual with new
and far more significant ambitions.  Specifically, I examine Mario Draghi’s
effort to re-design the communicative architecture of the euro in order to
speak to the predicaments of the European public beset by uncertainty.  Yet
to do this meant approaching the precipice: acknowledging that the ECB
had lost control of the management of monetary policy.
I focus on Draghi’s statements delivered not in Frankfurt, but first in
Brussels on July 9, 2012 to the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee
(ECON) of the European Parliament as part of the regular “monetary dia-
logue” between the two institutions, and then in London on July 26, 2012
at an investment conference.172  There is also a series of supplemental doc-
uments I examine: a report by the President of the European Council and a
paragraph in an IMF report on Spain, drafted at about the same time by
members of a network of overlapping groups of technocrats drawn from
the European Commission, the ECB, and the IMF, who had come to form
the intellectual apparatus for addressing the crisis.173
Draghi’s presentations were delivered at a time when the political
momentum for aggressive programs of austerity in the peripheral states of
the euro area, which had once been the cornerstone of the EU’s response to
the sovereign debt and banking crisis, had slowed.174  Europe as a whole
had entered an economic slowdown and policies of relentless austerity,
espoused most insistently by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, faced increasing popular resistance, as
well as growing recognition among experts and lay observers alike that
austerity was actually worsening the sovereign debt and banking crisis.175
171. See also Steven Erlanger, French and German Ties Fray Over Greek Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/world/europe/13europe.
html.
172. Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, Introductory Statement to the
Hearing at the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parlia-
ment (July 9, 2012) [hereinafter Draghi July 9], available at http://www.ecb.int/press/
key/date/2012/html/sp120709.en.html; Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank,
Speech at the Global Investment Conference in London (July 26, 2012) [hereinafter
Draghi July 26], available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/
sp120726.en.html.
173. Report by Herman Van Rompuy, President, of the European Council, Towards a
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (July 26, 2012), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/crisis/documents/131201_en.pdf; Int’l Monetary Fund,
2012 Article IV Consultation with Spain Concluding Statement of IMF Mission, ¶ 7 (June
14, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2012/061512.htm.
174. See Europe’s Austerity Pact: Running out of Road, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 23, 2012,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/23/europes-austerity-pact-edi-
torial (“[T]he politics of key member states [of the European Union] are moving in the
opposite direction [of austerity].”).
175. See Charles Kadlec, Austerity, and the Failure of the Governing Elite, FORBES, Apr.
30, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/charleskadlec/2012/04/30/austerity-and-the-
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\47-1\CIN102.txt unknown Seq: 30 29-MAY-14 10:17
44 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 47
Sarkozy’s defeat in the May 2012 presidential election to Franc¸ois Hol-
lande marked a shift of policy to programs emphasizing, at least rhetori-
cally, economic growth.176  Draghi, about this time, had cautiously
assumed a leadership role in publically defining and articulating the issues
at stake in the crisis, employing a very particular form of representational
labor.177
Draghi’s statement to the parliamentary committee recounted his
broad assessment of the upheaval and his anticipated role in its resolu-
tion.178  What he articulated would have been unthinkable a year earlier.
What was achievable had changed.  The deterioration of economic condi-
tions across Europe was playing a role— perhaps a decisive one— in foster-
ing Draghi’s willingness to address the stark details of the crisis.179  Most
notably, the ability of the ECB to conduct monetary policy had been com-
promised, its constitutional mandate impaired.180  This in itself served as
an emphatic pretext for unprecedented action.  Cautiously, and with little
in the way of hype, Draghi crafted a story, an evolving institutional story,
by which confidence could be reestablished and the issues of the moment
addressed if not resolved.181  Deeper still, Draghi provided hints about how
the entire project of European integration was being transformed and
endowed with new communicative features.182
Draghi, in contrast to his predecessor, was carefully disentangling the
ECB from the thrall of the Bundesbank.183  At a time when a consensus
about technical solutions to the crisis was gradually taking form among
technocratic elites,184 it was necessary to establish the rationale for those
failure-of-the-governing-elite/ (discussing the economic slowdown in Europe and attrib-
uting it largely to austerity). See also Mehdi Hasan, Angela Merkel’s Mania for Austerity
is Destroying Europe, NEW STATESMAN, June 20, 2012, http://www.newstatesman.com/
politics/politics/2012/06/angela-merkels-mania-austerity-destroying-europe; Karine G.
Barzegar & Ruby Russell, French Voters Reject Austerity Tack, Oust Sarkozy for Socialist
Leader, WASH. TIMES, May 6, 2012, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/
6/french-voters-reject-austerity-tack-oust-sarkozy-f/?page=all.
176. Barzegar & Russell, supra note 175. R
177. See Draghi July 26, supra note 172 (illustrating Draghi’s public discussion of R
economic and monetary developments in lieu of the crisis). See also Ralph Atkins, et al.,
Draghi Calls for Europe ‘Growth Compact,’ FIN. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2012, http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/fc894164-8ead-11e1-ac13-00144feab49a.html#axzz2jcRbrWMH (provid-
ing a specific example of Draghi speaking out about the issues at stake in the crisis).
178. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172. R
179. See Atkins et al., supra note 177 (“Mr. Draghi’s comments show how the ECB has R
been taken aback by signs of recent economic weakness . . . .”). See also Draghi July 26,
supra note 172 (“I think my assessment was candid and frank enough.”). R
180. See Draghi July 26, supra note 172 (addressing challenges to the mandate). R
181. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172. R
182. See id.
183. Jeff Black & Simon Kennedy, Draghi Courts Bundesbank in Bid to Avoid Trichet’s
Bond Fate, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-08/
draghi-courts-bundesbank-in-bid-to-avoid-trichet-s-fate-on-bond-purchases.html.
184. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPACT ON
AND RESPONSE BY THE EUROPEAN UNION 4– 6 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
crs/misc/R40415.pdf (finding that European leaders aimed to develop a common set of
procedures to address the financial crisis in 2009, but still disagreed on the details of
those regulatory schemes); Krister Koskelo, Europe: Between Technocracy and Democracy,
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solutions within a sustainable public discourse.  The challenge Draghi
faced was to model a communicative relationship by which the public was
persuaded to collaborate in the restoration of faith and credit in an irrevo-
cable monetary union.  In the statement that follows, Draghi struggles to
delineate this kind of story.  As we will see, depending on one’s perspec-
tive, the substance of what he spoke was either audacious or tragically
misguided.
Ownership of the Future
Halfway through Draghi’s statement of July 9 (which runs fewer than
two thousand words), he turned to a question posed by the ECON commit-
tee on the role of the ECB in the “economic adjustment” programs and the
bank’s oversight and management roles, describing the simple formula that
evolved to address the crisis and daringly speaking of “aftermath.”185  In
what reads as technocratic deadpan, he delineates in the simplest terms
possible the nature of ECB financial assistance, the reforms it is demand-
ing as the conditionality of loans, and the mechanisms of surveillance that
were in place to insure compliance.186  There is no strict invocation of the
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty or some other austere constitutional
principle; rather, the aims of the programs are expressed in pragmatic
terms of restoring the creditworthiness of member states such that they
can regain access to the credit markets and thus regain financial
viability.187
Draghi then turned to another more disquieting issue to support his
rhetorical interventions.  He acknowledged that to model a communicative
relationship with a European public— to recruit them to a task of restoring
features of a discernable future to their social lives and to underwrite that
future with institutional faith and credit— required troubling acknowledg-
ments about the past.188  An acceptance of responsibility was necessary to
render the circumstances of the crisis tractable and to give the European
public “ownership,” as Draghi termed it, of their future:
Today’s economic environment obliges all countries to take a very critical
look at their past— and it obliges all to take a very objective view of their
future.
It is only against the background of the past that the adjustment program-
mes currently underway in several euro area countries can be understood.
It was past economic developments and policies that led to excessive imbal-
ances in a number of countries.  And it was those imbalances— fiscal,
macroeconomic and external— that were neither healthy nor sustainable.
HARV. POL. REV. (Nov. 5, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/world/europe-
between-technocracy-and-democracy (stating that European technocratic leaders have
only reached consensus and substantive progress on policymaking regarding the sover-
eign debt crisis in 2012).
185. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172. R
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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Unsustainable imbalances provide the objective need for adjustment
programmes— and the degree of the adjustment is directly related to the
extent to which past policies were misguided.
Policy adjustment in the euro area takes place under market pressures, but
less so than for countries outside the euro area because being part of mone-
tary union shelters countries against some pressures, notably on the
exchange rate.
But this does not mean that the degree of policy adjustment can be lower.
The schedule of regaining full market access within a few years applies here
too.  Therefore, perseverance in bold and necessary reforms is crucial.
A critical success factor is ownership of the programmes by governments,
parliaments and ultimately the citizens of the countries concerned.  An
essential precondition for ownership is that policy-makers communicate
clearly about the economic rationale for adjustment.  As I have suggested,
this means taking a critical view of the past and an objective view of the
future.
This process has started.  Increasingly, national policy-makers make the
case for reform strongly.  They point to past developments in explaining the
background of adjustment and now highlight the many beneficial elements
of reforms.  Some of these reforms improve fairness by combating tax eva-
sion or rent-seeking by vested interests, and they improve the efficiency of
the public sector.
National policy-makers are now increasingly making a central part of their
objective the overall aim of EMU: to sustain economic well-being in the
absence of major imbalances, and to generate sustainable growth in a com-
petitive environment.189
When Georgios Papandreou revealed that Greece had been less than
candid about its fiscal situation in late 2009, thus precipitating the sover-
eign debt crisis, few in Europe were or should have been entirely sur-
prised.190  Put bluntly, Greek political leaders had misled the European
public, but they hid their misrepresentations in plain sight.191  The public
deferred to their authority while it harbored deep misgivings about the
judgment and trustworthiness of political elites.192  Greeks, perhaps more
than any other Europeans, cultivated scathing commentary in this regard,
and, ironically, some had long hoped for political intervention by the EU to
address what Greek politicians could not speak to.193  On the other hand,
European officials too were fully aware of the defects of the euro, the mis-
189. Id.
190. Rachel Donadio & Niki Kitsantonis, Greece Struggles to Tame Debt as Its People
Grow More Restive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2009, at A4.
191. HANS-WERNER SINN, CASINO CAPITALISM: HOW THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CAME ABOUT
AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW 244 (2010).
192. Rachel Donadio, Distrust of Government Impedes Greek Reform, N.Y. TIMES, June,
26, 2011, at A14.
193. See, e.g., George Iordanou, Golden Dawn is Growing –  Europe Must Help Curb the
Rise of the Far Right, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2013, 11:02 AM), http://www.theguard-
ian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/19/golden-dawn-europe-greek-cypriot; Nikos Kon-
standaras, A Handy Sense of Injustice, EKATHIMERINI (Feb. 20, 2011, 9:31 PM), http://
www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite3_1_20/02/2011_379478; Stavros
Lygeros, Redefining Populism, EKATHIMERINI (Jan. 20, 2011, 5:06 PM), http://www.
ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite3_1_20/01/2011_374344; Spiridon Paras-
kewopoulos, Who Will Stop the New Greek Tragedy?, INT’L TRADE NEWS ,http://www.inter-
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guided policies of euro member states, and the looming unsustainable
imbalances between the European nations; but they rarely brought these
insights to public attention.194  The spread of the crisis, as well as the cata-
strophic banking emergency that ensued, may have been hard to foresee,
but what Draghi said was obvious: that preconditions for the crisis were set
in place by misguided and/or unsustainable policies that must be acknowl-
edged and redressed to sustain economic growth and well being.195  Pro-
grams of reform and restructuring had to be made coherent to the public in
relation to the past history of political mismanagement.196
Draghi’s statement then veered to a positive appraisal of the results of
the reform process, which itself served as the basis of and for confidence,
despite there being, at the time, much evidence to the contrary:
In my view, a great deal of progress is underway in this respect.
For example, the Irish authorities have maintained a strong track record for
maintaining reform momentum throughout their programme.  They have
also taken important steps towards restoring the stability of the financial
system.
In Portugal, programme implementation remains good and important pro-
gress has been made in such areas as the labour market, the housing market,
the general competition framework, the judicial system and the transport
sector.  The Portuguese authorities remain fully committed to achieving this
year’s fiscal target.
The Spanish authorities too have shown that they remain fully committed to
accelerating the structural reform agenda and putting the financial sector on
a sound footing.  They are also committed to improving external competi-
tiveness to lay the foundations for more sustainable prosperity.
Even without programmes, many policy-makers are bold in reform.  In Italy,
for example, reforms to increase competition, reduce the administrative bur-
den and increase labour market flexibility have been important measures.
The country’s spending review will help to achieve the fiscal targets.
Virtually all other countries are undertaking measures to improve fiscal
solidity and the basis for sustainable growth without excessive imbalances.
So despite the current challenges, countries’ progress is strong and the fun-
damentals of the euro area as a whole are sound.
The euro area’s fiscal deficit is declining towards 3% of GDP; price stability
is ensured; and the external accounts have remained close to balance.  All
these are reasons to pursue reforms with a strong degree of confidence.197
In the wake of the arduous and fraught efforts to deal with the Greek,
Portuguese, Irish, Spanish, and Italian situations, and after countless meet-
ings and consultations, Draghi is suggesting that something fundamental
had been accomplished over and above the explicit aims of the reform pro-
nationaltradenews.com/news/articles/who_will_stop_the_new_greek_tragedy/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
194. Sven Bo¨ll et al., Operation Self-Deceit: New Documents Shine Light on Euro Birth
Defects, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (May 8, 2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/interna-
tional/europe/euro-struggles-can-be-traced-to-origins-of-common-currency-a-
831842.html.
195. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172. R
196. See id.
197. Id.
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grams and emergency interventions.  By virtue of the crisis, new under-
standings, new arrangements, and new working relationships among key
institutions have been established.  What was achievable and unachievable
has shifted and new understandings are beginning to emerge among the
institutional elites as to what is necessary to begin to fully achieve fiscal
union.  Restated, the processes and practices that had emerged to grapple
with the issues of the crisis had changed the facts of the crisis.  How did
this happen?
Stress Test
What we know is that by the time of Draghi’s presentation, groups of
experts had been struggling for over a year with the complex contingencies
of the various crises, vetting them, often in excruciating detail, in endless
rounds of meetings to provide policy remedies— remedies typically
amounting to limited short- and medium-term interventions.198  Senior
and mid-level officials of the ECB and the European Commission and their
staffs, along with their counterparts in ministries of national governments,
constituted the intellectual core of this apparatus.199  This epistemic net-
work also drew in experts in public finance and constitutional law from
academic institutions, think tanks, banking institutions, and, as the crisis
intensified, the staff of the IMF.200  These people crunched and re-
crunched numbers and thrashed out briefing documents, technical analy-
ses, and formal agreements that were drafted, rewritten, amended, over-
written, further revised and then rejected, accepted, or forgotten.201  Policy
makers brought crosscutting discussions of European law and, notably, the
constitutional mandate of the ECB was continually brought to bear on pol-
icy proposals and remedies.202  The ECB crafted supervisory and oversight
procedures to monitor the efficacy of policy interventions.203  Senior politi-
cal leaders positioned themselves in relation to these technical documents,
interpreting them vis-a`-vis their national constituencies and partisan inter-
198. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EUROPE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES (2009).
199. For one reflection on the cohesiveness of these entities working together in one
instance, see Herman Van Rompuy, President, European Council, Remarks Following
the Last Meeting of the Task Force on Economic Governance (Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117153.pdf.
200. See EUR. CENT. BANK., MONTHLY BULLETIN— FEBRUARY 2010 96, 107– 08 (2010)
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201002en.pdf.
201. See EUR. CENT. BANK. FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW (June 2011), available at http://
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/fsr/html/summary201106.en.html.
202. See EUR. CENT. BANK., MONTHLY BULLETIN— JANUARY  2010, 74, 74– 77 (2010),
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/mb/html/index.en.html.
203. See generally EUR. CENT. BANK, EUROSYSTEM OVERSIGHT POLICY FRAMEWORK (July
2011), available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/eurosystemoversightpol-
icyframework2011en.pdf.  The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is one such device
intended to “complement the new framework for reinforced economic surveillance in the
EU.” European Stability Mechanism (ESM)— Q&A, EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-10-636_en.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
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ests.204  Negotiations over loans and austerity programs— between and
among peripheral states, the ECB, the European Commission, and the
IMF205— traced the limits of macroeconomic adjustments, political persua-
sion, and, above all, public forbearance.
Incidental to the arduous work of dealing with the particular issues of
crisis management, these working groups had assimilated what was per-
haps the most thorough and nuanced understanding of interrelated ele-
ments of the political economy of the euro area available.  Learning from
the Portuguese, Irish, Greek, Spanish, and Italian episodes which interven-
tions and remedies worked and which did not, they had developed— over
the course of a little over a year, through trial and error— informal under-
standings and working relationships to systematically address the issues of
the crisis.206  They learned about the historical and cultural differences
defining finance and political economy in these nations.207  They also
learned of the sensitivities and anxieties of diverse national constituen-
cies— not only in the member states in need of assistance but also in those
providing assistance.208  Not insignificantly, they also confronted the bas-
tions of power, privilege, and immunity that characterized the “private”
financial prerogatives of European elites.
Equally important was the reflexive dynamic of this learning process,
which, by constantly testing what the EU institutions could and could not
do, amounted to a deep anthropology of these institutions.209  Each phase
of crisis management demonstrated the incomplete design of the EU in
general and of the ECB in particular.210  In reaction to this completeness,
working understandings and even creative interventions developed.  Again,
these working groups fully recognized that using the circumstance of the
crisis to compel these necessary reforms across the eurozone (addressing,
most notably, competitiveness, budgetary discipline, and banking regula-
tion) was fortuitous.211  Engineering policy interventions around explicit
constitutional constraints and limitations under the Maastricht Treaty cre-
204. See, e.g., Rescue Fund Controversy: France and Italy Seek Ultimate Firepower for
ESM, SPIEGEL ONLINE, July 31, 2012, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/
europe/euro-zone-states-discuss-plan-to-give-esm-unlimited-funding-from-ecb-a-847415.
html.
205. See, e.g., Statement by the EC, ECB, and IMF on the Review Mission to Ireland,
EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-720_en.htm (Last visited
Oct. 31, 2010).
206. See EUR. CENT. BANK, THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS: LESSONS FOR FINANCIAL STABIL-
ITY AND MONETARY POLICY (May 2010), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/
other/greatfinancialcrisisecbcolloquiumpapademos201203en.pdf.
207. See generally EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 198; EUR. CENT. BANK, supra note R
206. R
208. See Nicholas Sambanis, Has ‘Europe’ Failed?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/opinion/has-europe-failed.html?_r=0.
209. See generally CHRIS SHORE, BUILDING EUROPE (2000) (offering an anthropological
study of the European institutions).
210. See Peter Praet, Member of Exec. Bd. of the European Cent. Bank, The Crisis
Response in the Euro Area (Apr. 17, 2013), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/
2013/html/sp130417.en.html.
211. See id.
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ated some of the most vexing dilemmas for this coterie of technocrats.212
What had they learned?
The final section of Draghi’s statement summarized a report that had
been published two weeks earlier, entitled “Towards a Genuine Economic
and Monetary Union.”213  Drafted under the European Council president,
Herman Van Rompuy, and coauthored by the president of the European
Commission, Jose´ Manuel Barroso, and by Draghi himself, representing the
Eurogroup and the ECB, the document demonstrated that a shared posi-
tion on fiscal and monetary union— a collaborative vision— had emerged
from the wrenching negotiations:214
A longer-term vision for EMU
Why then do we still have tensions in a number of market segments?  Let me
first stress that a lot has been done at country as well as euro area level in
terms of economic reforms and governance.  But we need full implementa-
tion.  We have to make clear that EMU is a union based on stability at
national and aggregate levels.
Stability at national level means completing reforms to ensure sustainable
growth without major imbalances.  Stability at aggregate level means imple-
menting the vision recently presented at the summit.
The central message of that vision is this: the euro is here to stay— and the
euro area will take the necessary steps to ensure that.
In my view, the core of the report submitted by President Van Rompuy is the
identification of four building blocks:
First, a financial market union that elevates responsibility for supervision of
banks to the euro area level.
Second, a fiscal union that reinforces oversight of budgetary policies at the
euro area level and also provides some fiscal capacity to support the func-
tioning of the currency area.
Third, an economic union with sufficient mechanisms to ensure that coun-
tries can achieve sustained prosperity without excessive imbalances.
And finally a political union that strengthens the legitimacy of EMU among
euro area citizens and deepens its political foundations.
These four building blocks are mutually consistent and coherent, and
should be pursued in parallel.  I am looking forward to the work on a
roadmap that has started.  In my view, three issues deserve particular
attention:
First, we need to move towards a further sharing of sovereignty in the fiscal,
financial and economic domains.  There can be no shortcuts in establishing
a sound and stable EMU.
Second, EMU is an integral part of the Treaty.  This calls on all relevant
bodies and actors to engage constructively on improving its functioning, not
only at Union but also at national level.  To call for an impeccable applica-
tion of the Treaty and at the same time refuse closer union mentioned in
Article 1 of the Treaty is inconsistent, to say the least.
Third, we need to accompany deeper euro area integration with significant
progress on democratic legitimacy and accountability.  There is no doubt
212. See Wolfgang Mu¨nchau, The Dangers of Europe’s Technocratic Busybodies, FIN.
TIMES, July 14, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3b2d9f32-ea3d-11e2-b2f4-00144
feabdc0.html#axzz2jQlve75h.
213. Van Rompuy, supra note 173. R
214. See id.
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that you and your colleagues— the members of the European Parliament, the
directly elected representatives of the citizens of Europe— will continue to
play a central role in the steps towards political union.215
Separately, the IMF had officially sanctioned this program.216  A for-
mer IMF official, Gabriel Sterne, suggested that I review an unusual section
of an official report that the IMF published on June 14, 2012, entitled
“2012 Article IV Consultation with Spain Concluding Statement of IMF
Mission.”  Paragraph 7 reads as follows:
Spain’s prospects will also be helped by further progress at the European
level.  There is an immediate need at the euro area level to ensure adequate
bank funding and mitigate contagion.  But a lasting resolution to the Euro
area crisis will require a convincing and concerted move toward a complete
and robust EMU.  This requires a roadmap toward a banking union and fis-
cal integration.  A clear commitment in this direction, in particular on area-
wide deposit insurance and a bank resolution framework with common
backstops, is essential to chart a credible path ahead.217
This statement is remarkable insofar as the IMF is not merely confirming
participation in a particular series of interventions to aid a specific coun-
try, but is also prospectively ratifying an outline of a comprehensive pro-
gram that is addressing the entire eurozone crisis.
Taboo
I indicated above that constitutional challenges marked the most seri-
ous impediments to action by the ECB to address the crisis.  The direct
purchase of member states’ debt— violating the “no bailout” clause of the
treaty— provoked what appeared to be insurmountable constitutional
obstacles for Bundesbank officials and the German government.218  How-
ever, without this kind of intervention, the cost— that is, the interest rates
demanded by the market to fund ongoing Spanish and Italian financial
needs— would be crushing.219  At the end of July, in a speech— in many
respects, it was more a series of informal comments— to the Global Invest-
ment Conference in London, Draghi hinted at an argument that trumped
these constitutional inhibitions.220  His opening comments amounted to a
manifesto of sorts for a public currency:
215. Draghi July 9, supra note 172 (emphasis in original). R
216. See Rachel Cooper, IMF Backs Mario Draghi’s Bond-Buying Plan, THE TELEGRAPH,
Sep. 9, 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/9531378/IMF-backs-Mario-
Draghis-bond-buying-plan.html.
217. INT’L MONETARY FUND, 2012 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION WITH SPAIN CONCLUDING
STATEMENT OF IMF MISSION, (June 2012), available at www.imf.org/external/np/ms/
2012/061512.htm.
218. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 125, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 99. See also Stephen Castle & Melissa Eddy, Bond
Plan Lowers Debt Costs, but Germany Grumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 7, 2012,
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/business/global/daily-euro-zone-watch.html.
219. See William L. Watts, Draghi’s ‘Convertibility’ Fears Set ECB Tough Task,
MarketWatch, Aug. 31, 2012, www.marketwatch.com/story/draghi-convertibility-wor-
ries-set-ecb-tough-task-2012-08-31/.
220. Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
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[T]he . . . message I would like to send today, is that progress has been
extraordinary in the last six months.  If you compare today the euro area
member states with six months ago, you will see that the world is entirely
different today, and for the better.
And this progress has taken different shapes.  At national level, because of
course, while I was saying, while I was glorifying the merits of the euro, you
were thinking “but that’s an average!”, and “in fact countries diverge so
much within the euro area, that averages are not representative any longer,
when the variance is so big.”
But I would say that over the last six months, this average, well the variances
tend to decrease and countries tend to converge much more than they have
done in many years— both at national level, in countries like Portugal, Ire-
land and countries that are not in the programme, like Spain and Italy.
The progress in undertaking deficit control, structural reforms has been
remarkable.  And they will have to continue to do so.  But the pace has been
set and all the signals that we get is that they don’t relent, stop reforming
themselves.  It’s a complex process because for many years, very little was
done— I will come to this in a moment.
But a lot of progress has been done at supranational level.  That’s why I
always say that the last summit was a real success.  The last summit was a
real success because for the first time in many years, all the leaders of the 27
countries of Europe, including UK etc., said that the only way out of this
present crisis is to have more Europe, not less Europe.
A Europe that is founded on four building blocks: a fiscal union, a financial
union, an economic union and a political union.  These blocks, in two
words— we can continue discussing this later— mean that much more of what
is national sovereignty is going to be exercised at supranational level, that
common fiscal rules will bind government actions on the fiscal side.
Then in the banking union or financial markets union, we will have one
supervisor for the whole euro area.  And to show that there is full determina-
tion to move ahead and these are not just empty words, the European Com-
mission will present a proposal for the supervisor in early September.  So in
a month.  And I think I can say that works are quite advanced in this
direction.
So more Europe, but also the various firewalls have been given attention and
now they are ready to work much better than in the past.
The second message is that there is more progress than it has been
acknowledged.
But the third point I want to make is in a sense more political.
When people talk about the fragility of the euro and the increasing fragility
of the euro, and perhaps the crisis of the euro, very often non-euro area
member states or leaders, underestimate the amount of political capital that
is being invested in the euro.
And so we view this, and I do not think we are unbiased observers, we think
the euro is irreversible.  And it’s not an empty word now, because I preceded
saying exactly what actions have been made, are being made to make it
irreversible.
But there is another message I want to tell you.
Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the
euro.  And believe me, it will be enough.221
221. Id.
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At the close of his remarks, Draghi made a rather offhanded comment
that tested the limits of the speakable and the unspeakable:
These premia [the inordinately high interest rates] . . . have to do more and
more with convertibility, with the risk of convertibility.  Now to the extent
that these premia do not have to do with factors inherent to my
counterparty— they come into our [the ECB] mandate.  They come within
our remit.
To the extent that the size of these sovereign premia hampers the functioning
of the monetary policy transmission channel, they come within our
mandate.
So we have to cope with this financial fragmentation [by] addressing these
issues.222
Stating that there was a “convertibility risk” influencing the divergent
pricing of debt among member states, Draghi acknowledged what every-
one knew— that the market was pricing the possibility that the sovereign
debt of some member state or states would ultimately be paid off in reis-
sued national currencies, which would in all likelihood be of diminished
value.223  Crudely, the higher the interest premia demanded by the market,
the more onerous the burden on the member state, and the more overt the
expectancy of its exit from the euro.224  But, of course, this was a self-
fulfilling proposition:
By admitting that this “convertibility risk” now exists, the ECB president has
implicitly acknowledged that the permanence of the single currency is not
fully credible in the financial markets.  The recognition of redenomination
risk after a potential devaluation is one reason, he implies, why sovereign
bond yields are now so high in Spain and Italy.  He has said that this pre-
vents the ECB from transmitting its intended monetary stance into those
economies, which gives the ECB the right to take direct action to reduce
these bond yields.225
Draghi averred that there was a paramount authority— the ECB’s constitu-
tional mandate to manage monetary policy across the eurozone— that over-
ruled restrictions on bond purchases as well as other unorthodox
interventions.226  Perceived convertibility risk, namely the interest premia
imposed by the bond market, was a clear and irrefutable challenge to the
ECB’s management of interest rates.227  Restoring the ECB’s authority
demanded that these differentials be eliminated, not merely to relieve the
financial burdens imposed on specific member states, but to restore the
ECB’s control over the transmission of monetary policy, which would,
thereby, reestablish the credibility of the common currency.228  The
222. Id.
223. See Gavyn Davies, Draghi Breaks The Ultimate Euro Taboo, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2012, blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2012/08/05/draghi-breaks-the-ultimate-euro-taboo/.
224. See Draghi July 26, supra note 172. See also Watts, supra note 219. R
225. Davies, supra note 223. R
226. See Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
227. See id.
228. See id.  Draghi, in his London comments, reviewed the breakdown of the trans-
mission mechanism that had reversed monetary integration as follows:
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purchase of short dated bonds by the ECB under what came to be known
as “Outright Monetary Transactions” (OMTs) was deemed by Draghi as the
means to accomplish this constitutional gambit.229
The proposal was welcomed and supported by political leaders, nota-
bly even in Germany, though almost immediately it was subjected to
restrictions and conditionalities aimed at continuing pressure on those
member states petitioning for this kind of assistance, requiring them to
cede further control and supervision over economic and financial matters
to the so-called triumvirate, i.e. representatives of the European Commis-
sion, the IMF, and the ECB.230  There were many other potential obstacles.
Nevertheless, Draghi’s interventions, however tentative, represented a
means to begin to create a plausible, if not robust, legal basis for new and
unprecedented ECB initiatives.  The ECB, in Draghi’s view, had the right—
indeed, the obligation— to undertake those initiatives necessary to retain its
control over monetary policy, and this assertion of the bank’s legal author-
ity was translated into a mantra that began to be repeated by senior offi-
cials of the bank, that the ECB would “do whatever it takes” to preserve and
protect the viability of the common currency.231
Most of the journalistic attention at the time was focused, quite
rightly, on the dramatic nature of the OMTs, the resulting restoration of
ECB control of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and
There are some short-term challenges, to say the least.  The short-term chal-
lenges in our view relate mostly to the financial fragmentation that has taken
place in the euro area.  Investors retreated within their national boundaries.  The
interbank market is not functioning.  It is only functioning very little within
each country by the way, but it is certainly not functioning across countries.
And I think the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out of this crisis,
we have to repair this financial fragmentation.
There are at least two dimensions to this.  The interbank market is not function-
ing, because for any bank in the world the current liquidity regulations make—
to lend to other banks or borrow from other banks— a money-losing proposition.
So the first reason is that regulation has to be recalibrated completely.
The second point is in a sense a collective action problem: because national
supervisors, looking at the crisis, have asked their banks, the banks under their
supervision, to withdraw their activities within national boundaries.  And they
ring fenced liquidity positions so liquidity can’t flow, even across the same hold-
ing group because the financial sector supervisors are saying “no.”
So even though each one of them may be right, collectively they have been
wrong.  And this situation will have to be overcome of course.
And then there is a risk aversion factor.  Risk aversion has to do with
counterparty risk.  Now to the extent that I think my counterparty is going to
default, I am not going to lend to this counterparty.  But it can be because it is
short of funding.  And I think we took care of that with the two big LTROs where
we injected half a trillion of net liquidity into the euro area banks.  We took care
of that.
Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
229. Not Too Little, Possibly Too Late, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2012, http://www.econ-
omist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/09/ecbs-new-bond-purchase-programme.
230. Phil Levy, Foreign Policy: OMG, It’s The OMT!, NPR (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:32 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/09/10/160872662/foreign-policy-omg-its-the-omt.
231. See Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
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Draghi’s new and emphatic refrain.232  I turn, in the last section of this
article, to a different, perhaps far more important, aspect of the transforma-
tions that were gaining articulation in the summer of 2012.  Finance and
political economy were, I will argue, allied in a manner that spoke cre-
atively to the predicaments of the public, extending the reach of a new
monetary regime.
Re-functioning Finance
Over the course of eight weeks or so in the summer of 2012, Draghi
had orchestrated a series of interventions that could meaningfully address
the overall crisis.233  The elements of his proposal, though technically
daunting, could be articulated in a simple fashion encompassing a handful
of essential features.  Above all, the program could be communicated— it
could be made plausible to various strata and segments of the public.
Indeed, its efficacy depended on a communicative dynamic that was
future-oriented and designed specifically to shape or reshape expectations.
The time horizons and the ends and purposes of policy interventions had
shifted.  The EU was no longer simply focused on pressing emergency mea-
sures to forestall some impending calamity or merely buying time to
orchestrate the details of fiscal union; it now had a “longer-term vision,”
permitting a very different kind of intellectual labor and, perhaps, far more
consequential outcomes.234  Again, the crisis served not only as the pretext
for further programs of integration, but also, for the purposes of this text,
the impetus for exploration and reevaluation of the imperatives defining a
public currency.
The endless rounds of meetings, the never-ending scrutiny of conflict-
ing proposals and remedies, the continual encounters with policy dead
ends— this messy and uncertain process itself— far from signaling the
unraveling of the European project, was in fact furthering, perhaps reso-
lutely, the pragmatic design of the of the European project.235
Draghi not only acknowledged the urgency of imparting a relational
language to the monetary regime, but also he asserted in his London
remarks that enhancing “social cohesion” was the decisive feature of the
EU’s approach to the crisis.236  Significantly, the earlier monetary union of
Germany in the 1990s was accomplished with the same language; the sub-
stantial funding of unification has and continues to be paid for with a “soli-
darity tax.”237  That said, the commitments to sustain social welfare and
the promises to preserve human dignity were rarely acknowledged as over-
232. Jim Boulden, OMG! OMTs Have Arrived to Save the Euro, CNN, (Sept. 6, 2012,
4:01 PM) http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2012/09/06/omg-omts-have-arrived-to-save-
the-euro-2/?iid=article_sidebar.
233. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172. See also Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
234. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172. R
235. See JEAN MONNET, ME´MOIRES (1976); SHORE, supra note 209. R
236. See Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
237. Reunification ‘Solidarity Tax’ Stays for Now, High Court Rules, THE LOCAL (Sept.
23, 2010, 3:11 PM) http://www.thelocal.de/20100923/30035.
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riding concerns in the midst of the crisis.  But in the summer of 2012,
Draghi saw fit to foreground them as such, as an essential feature of a
“promissory vision.”238
Many inside and outside of Europe had good reason to be deeply skep-
tical of this claim of fidelity to the weighted terminology of social cohesion
and solidarity, and they had every reason to dismiss it as a convenient, if
not cynical, rhetorical gesture.  But the notion that saving the euro required
a redesign of the basic imperatives of the financial system and opening
them to public scrutiny was nonetheless theoretically plausible.  In other
words, not just the completion of the project of monetary union, but some-
thing more ambitious was needed; something that both ratified the original
promissory vision of the European project and went beyond it.  What might
this transformation look like?
David Westbrook has outlined the fundamental criteria for re-func-
tioning elements of the financial system aligned explicitly with the prag-
matic ideals of social cohesion:
In a global society in which social commitments have been capitalized and
are held on a portfolio basis by highly leveraged and interdependent institu-
tions, the traditional imagination of finance— how to intermediate scarce
capital between savers and worthy entrepreneurs, while preventing fraud—
should lose its dominance, to be replaced by a more custodial understanding
of the vitality of stable capital to social order and humane understandings of
institutions.  The pension fund, the university endowment, or even a bank’s
sovereign debt portfolio, rather than the venture capitalist and the entrepre-
neur, should become the paradigmatic figures for contemporary thinking
about capitalism and its regulation. . . .  Should the relevant elites take this
conceptual turn to social capitalism operating on an economy of money, the
aesthetics and so practices of financial market regulation will be far different
from those that have characterized the last several decades.239
Westbrook’s agenda approximates what Draghi and his colleagues were
contemplating, though they might demur that this transformation was
already underway and, as suggested above, its principles of solidarity and
social cohesion had become essential instruments for the resolution of the
then-current upheaval in Europe.
If the project of monetary union could be threatened by the utterance
of “convertibility risk,” perhaps it could be saved by the classic terminol-
ogy of “social cohesion.”  This is, of course, little more than facile short-
hand for what is truly at stake here, the acknowledgment that the
resolution of the challenges facing Europe required a language— one capa-
ble of modeling societal commitments and promises, that could account
for a diversely constituted European public.240  Draghi’s agenda for social
238. SUNDER RAJAN, supra note 10, at 115. R
239. David A. Westbrook, Problematique, Rethinking Financial Markets Conference,
WORLD ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION (Nov. 1– Dec. 31, 2012), http://rfconference2012.world
economicsassociation.org/problematique/.
240. In a subsequent speech entitled “Revisiting the European Social Contract,”
Benoˆıt Cœure´, one of Draghi’s close allies on the Executive Board of the ECB, further
elaborated on these issues:
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cohesion and solidarity started, not insignificantly, with European-wide
bank deposit insurance, a scheme that linked the private vulnerabilities of
depositors to the construction of a banking union.241  The task was to cre-
ate a terminology for the technical working of public and private finance
that could address human expectations in a manner that would be suffi-
ciently persuasive to re-endow the future with discernable features.
Draghi’s most powerful and shrewd insight, as indicated above, was
that there was now an audience, a vast audience across Europe that had not
yet been constituted as recently as 2009, increasingly anxious for the kind
of message he and his colleagues were formulating.242  Despite the stirring
of all manner of populist radicalism and intellectual discontent, there was
an anxious public eager for the kind of program— simple, persuasive, and
timely— outlined above.  There was a broadly constituted European public
increasingly eager for a common agenda cast in the familiar metaphors and
tropes of European integration, a public that was increasingly impatient
with technical objections, divisive political partisanship, and narrowly
framed financial interests thwarting efforts at resolution.243  Here, too,
Draghi interpellated an emerging public as protagonists with whom he
could collaborate to alter the course of the crisis and shape its after-
math.244  The public— particularly the Europeans among us— were assum-
ing a decisive role in crafting and articulating monetary stories modeling
hopes and outcomes.
Despite this optimistic appraisal, Draghi’s agenda may end in tears.
Indeed, a small journalistic and academic industry has developed around
crafting catastrophic stories about the impending collapses of the euro.245
Draghi admitted that the currency had, under pressure from the bond mar-
ket, become untethered from the narrative management of the technocratic
officialdom of central banks.246  He further conceded that if central banks
lose control of the monetary story, lose control of their communicative
In the crisis, the ECB’s continued commitment to price stability and the integ-
rity of the euro has been one of the few elements of certainty in a highly volatile
and uncertain environment.  This commitment to monetary stability is not only
grounded in its economic merits but is also a cornerstone of the social contract.
It protects poorer households from the dire effects of inflation on purchasing
power.  It ensures that no redistribution of wealth takes place that is unsanc-
tioned by democratic processes, which is exactly what inflation does.  And it
buttresses political stability by avoiding the social unrest that unchecked infla-
tion can cause.
Cœure´, supra note 166.  Cœure´ went on to articulate, again in the language of European R
integration, the new role of the ECB as a key institutional actor in the project of creating
and underwriting the multiple dimensions of European solidarity. See id.
241. The project of solidarity and technocratic planning that Paul Rabinow describes
dates to the early nineteenth century in France and commences with infrastructural
projects, public health programs, and the extension of insurance benefits to the public.
See RABINOW, supra note 168. R
242. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172; see also Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
243. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172; see also Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
244. See generally WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PHANTOM PUBLIC (1925).
245. Hans-Werner Sinn & Timo Wollmersha¨user, Target Loans, Current Account Bal-
ances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility, 19 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 468 (2012).
246. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172; see also Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
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relationship with the public, alternative narratives are available for stabiliz-
ing or destabilizing the link between money and the existential circum-
stances of the public.247  In late 2011 and early 2012, the communicative
features of the euro were severely tested in just this fashion as the techno-
cratic discourse of the ECB faltered and highly contentious monetary sto-
ries circulated, revealing how a public currency can attain highly
dissonant features.248
In the summer of 2012, Draghi and his colleagues radically recast the
monetary allegory.  What will result is uncertain.  What we do know is
that a remarkable monetary drama is unfolding in which monumental
shifts of expectations are in play.  Whatever the fate of the euro, the out-
come, in all likelihood, will rest on the ability of central bankers to model
the future with persuasive words that can sustain— or even enhance— the
operation of a public currency.
Promissory Vision
“Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up largely of promises.”249
Roscoe Pound, 1922
The rancorous struggles that emerged in the midst of the 2012 Euro-
pean sovereign-debt crisis forced Mario Draghi to creatively articulate what
is broadly at stake in the management of a public currency: the totality of
promises that bind us together.  Ben Bernanke and his colleagues on the
FOMC were also busy in 2012, addressing the discontents of the crisis with
a new set of priorities by which they revised the relational and communica-
tive dynamics of the monetary regime.250  In the restrained language of
FOMC press releases, they, like Draghi, elaborated the manifesto for a pub-
lic currency with an acute promissory vision.251
The FOMC’s January 25 statement contained a belated commitment to
an inflation-targeting regime.252  Still, the statement also broached the out-
line of an agenda that foreshadowed a radical departure from the orthodox-
ies of that regime— a fact that few noticed at the time.253  The presaging
247. See Draghi July 9, supra note 172; see also Draghi July 26, supra note 172. R
248. Peter Levring, European Stocks Post Weekly Decline as ECB Quells Bond-Buying
Speculation, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-12-09/european-stocks-post-weekly-decline-as-ecb-quells-bond-buying-specula-
tion.html; Jeff Black & Jana Randow, ECB May Soften Stance as Draghi’s Recovery Falters,
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-02/
ecb-may-soften-stance-as-draghi-s-tentative-recovery-withers.html.
249. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
250. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve (Dec. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release Dec.
12], available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20121212a.htm.
251. See id.
252. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release Jan. 25],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120125c.
htm.
253. But see Gavyn Davies, Major Change in Bernanke’s Policy Reaction Function, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2012, 6:33 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2012/12/16/a-major-
change-in-bernankes-policy-reaction-function/; see also Robin Harding, Central Bankers
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came in a section addressing the nature of employment and
unemployment:
The maximum level of employment is largely determined by nonmonetary
factors that affect the structure and dynamics of the labor market.  These
factors may change over time and may not be directly measurable.  Conse-
quently, it would not be appropriate to specify a fixed goal for employment;
rather, the Committee’s policy decisions must be informed by assessments
of the maximum level of employment, recognizing that such assessments are
necessarily uncertain and subject to revision.  The Committee considers a
wide range of indicators in making these assessments.  Information about
Committee participants’ estimates of the longer-run normal rates of output
growth and unemployment is published four times per year in the FOMC’s
Summary of Economic Projections.  For example, in the most recent projec-
tions, FOMC participants’ estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unem-
ployment had a central tendency of 5.2 percent to 6.0 percent, roughly
unchanged from last January but substantially higher than the correspond-
ing interval several years earlier.254
Although this commentary remained largely unelaborated throughout
much of 2012, in August Michael Woodford delivered a long paper at the
Jackson Hole conference sponsored by the Kansas City Federal Reserve
Bank, which provided critical academic background for what Bernanke
and his colleagues were contemplating.255  Then, in the December 12
FOMC statement and in the lengthy news conference by the chairman that
followed, the policy imperative was articulated:
In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal
funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exception-
ally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long
as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between
one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage
point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term
inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.256
With its famous concision, the Committee was establishing the rate of
unemployment as the targeting mechanism for its interest-rate policies.  It
was casting its statutory obligation of “promoting maximum employment”
as an overt priority for its future decisions.  Put simply, it would publicly
target an unemployment rate.  But the Committee was doing more; it was
also providing us, the public, with its model, a simple conceptual formula
by which we could anticipate future FOMC policy decisions.  This “for-
ward guidance” anticipated a time, which could not be precisely dated,
when the exceptional monetary measures created to deal with the crisis
would be curtailed and/or reversed.  We would know when that time
Give Voice to a Revolution, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012, 6:54 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/
cms/s/0/cbfae4f4-45e0-11e2-b7ba-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2KzS8FgeZ.
254. Press Release Jan. 25, supra note 252. R
255. Michael Woodford, Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower
Bond, Revised Draft of Paper Presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Sym-
posium: The Changing Policy Landscape 44 (Sept. 16, 2012), (available at http://
www.columbia.edu/~mw2230/JHole2012final.pdf).
256. Press Release Dec. 12, supra note 250. R
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approached by observing the unemployment rate and adjusting our expec-
tations accordingly.257
An inflation rate speaks to the abstract behavior of prices; an unem-
ployment rate speaks to the existential struggles of labor.  Shifting from an
emphasis on the former target to the latter thus has more than a technical
significance: it foregrounds a different promissory vision, a different con-
stellation of public interests.  With this policy shift, the members of the
FOMC were certainly not seeking to endorse anything like a vast European
social model encompassing solidarity, guarantees of social welfare, and
human dignity.  Still, their commitment spoke to something like an Ameri-
can articulation of the social contract.
One of the most curious features of central bank communications, as
indicated at every turn in this article, is their propensity to disguise their
most profound and far-reaching features with linguistic austerity.  In the
FOMC statement from early 2012, there is an aside that is easy to overlook
or to dismiss as mere boilerplate:
The Committee seeks to explain its monetary policy decisions to the public
as clearly as possible.  Such clarity facilitates well-informed decisionmaking
by households and businesses, reduces economic and financial uncertainty,
increases the effectiveness of monetary policy, and enhances transparency
and accountability, which are essential in a democratic society.258
But this austere declaration may well constitute the clearest statement
of the social contract encompassed by a public currency.  Rather than an
explicit guarantee of any particular benefit, subvention, or ennobling pre-
rogative, the commitment is to provide us with the intellectual material—
data and analysis— by which we, the public, can make decisions— by which
we, as protagonists, can sustain the totality of promises of a distinctive
social order.
Mise-en-sce`ne
Janet Yellen’s 2013 assertion that “explanation is policy” opens the
way, as I have argued in this article, for an appraisal of an emergent mone-
tary regime, a public currency.259  Explanation takes on a decisive role
within this regime; it operates not merely as detached analytical accounts,
but as narrative instruments for recruiting the public to participate in the
creation and execution of policy.  Explanation thus unfolds as persuasive
stories— underwritten by data and intelligence— by which the public is
interpellated as protagonists who collaborate with central bankers in the
making, unmaking, and remaking of monetary and financial conditions.  I
further argued that the intellectual field upon which policy and regulation
unfold no longer fully or necessarily conforms to the disciplinary
257. Michael Woodford, supra note 255. R
258. Press Release Jan. 25, supra note 252. R
259. Yellen, supra note 1. R
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conventions of economics and finance; rather, it has assumed a broad and
emphatic anthropological cast.260
260. See also Holmes, supra note 20. R
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